The content of President Chen Shui-bian's (
Both Chinese President Hu Jintao's (
Their tactics can be summarized as being "tougher on the hard issues, and softer on the soft issues." It is up to the other party, though, to interpret what is tough and what is soft.
Whether a full understanding of the other side's stance will be enough to dispel fantasy so that reality can be dealt with in a pragmatic manner will depend on a change in thinking by the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
What garnered the attention of outsiders most in Chen's speech was the formal proposal that both sides use the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong as a basis for preparations to move toward resumed dialogue, as well as Chen's promise to invite party leaders to establish a Committee for Cross-strait Peace and Development to push forward constitutional reforms after this year's legislative election.
What was the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong about? Why didn't Chen use the term "1992 consensus" instead? What is the difference between the two expressions?
Actually the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong mainly dealt with the issue of how to interpret and handle the issue of "one China." Both sides did make their own interpretations of "one China" in the 1992 meeting, but they certainly had different views on whether a consensus was reached.
Now Taipei is willing to take a step forward based on the 1992 meeting. This is not necessarily a regression from the previous state, when both parties gave their own interpretations of "one China."
Why is it necessary to establish a Committee for Cross-strait Peace and Development? What lessons should the committee learn from the earlier National Unification Council and the Advisory Group on Cross-strait Relations?
Through the committee, the ruling and opposition parties can together push forward constitutional reform. This proposition shows that Chen realizes there is a common concern held by China, the US and even Taiwan internally, that future constitutional reform may trigger a cross-strait crisis.
Because the international community is worried about potential military tension across the Strait, the formation of a committee to promote peace and development is essential for easing doubts and worries over constitutional reform.
To approach the cross-strait relationship in a pragmatic manner, Taipei needs to realize that showing goodwill takes consistent and continual efforts, as well as practical measures. Taipei should not lose patience if Beijing does not respond immediately; neither should such a strategy be affected by the end-of-year legislative elections.
Even if a cross-strait dialogue is unlikely to materialize in the near future, a double authorization mechanism (that is, allowing the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to authorize another entity to delegate negotiations) should be activated now to facilitate cross-strait shipping and direct chartered flights during the Lunar New Year. Such a mechanism will also be needed to negotiate with Beijing on allowing Chinese citizens to visit Taiwan.
Beijing should be aware that the Chen administration did not recognize the 1992 consensus because it believed that Beijing and Taipei only made their own interpretations of "one China" with no consensus reached. Even if there had been a consensus, Beijing should know very well that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has never seen eye to eye with China in the definition of "one China."
It is a hard fact that leaders on both sides have reached no consensus over "one China." Given this, to argue over whether a consensus was reached 12 years ago is simply misplacing our priorities. After all, the fact that Taipei disagrees with Beijing's interpretation of "one China" is identical to Taipei's disagreement with Beijing's interpretation of the Republic of China.
Therefore, the main issue of cross-strait development is not whether a consensus was reached, but how both sides should pragmatically pursue dialogue given the lack of a consensus on the "one China" issue.
We, on the one hand, would like to urge Taipei to activate the double authorization mechanism immediately and start negotiations with Beijing on chartered flights for passengers and cargo and other issues. We also expect Beijing to reintroduce the model used in the meeting for such issues as renewing contracts for Taiwan-Hong Kong flights, allowing Taipei officials to enter Hong Kong and leading negotiations under the title of consultants.
Will we see such dialogue take shape in the near future? It requires only a change in thinking by the leaders on both sides.
Andy Chang is a professor in the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath