Football hooliganism and nationalism create a witch's brew that, until lately, has rarely been sipped in Asia. That changed at the recent Asian Football Cup.
Wherever Japan's players went, they were met by hostile crowds, which culminated in the championship match with China before a huge -- and hugely hostile -- crowd in Beijing. This is especially worrisome because, unlike elsewhere in the world, official manipulation helps fan the flames of nationalism in China.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
Young Chinese have been thoroughly indoctrinated with anti-Japanese sentiments. China's former president Jiang Zemin systematically and relentlessly pursued a "Resistance and Victory over Japan Campaign" throughout the 1990s -- a sinister device used to divert popular grievances and to legitimize continuing Communist rule by making the party appear to be the defender of Chinese honor.
At the same time, the ancient sense of cultural superiority that runs in Chinese veins makes feelings of inferiority hard to bear. With China's growing sense of itself as a superpower, resentment about the country being poorer and less admired than some other nations has become intolerable.
Now the young people who make up the vanguard of China's economic modernization are also nationalist-minded football hooligans. Instead of providing an early showcase of decent spectator manners for the Beijing Olympics of 2008, the Asian Cup provided a glimpse at the rage that seethes beneath China's economic boom -- and exposed the government's inability to control its increasingly restless people.
Of course, the bitterness of Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II helps set the stage for such nationalist outbursts, but the roots of China's rage go deeper. Even as China grows richer and more powerful, memories of its past suffering and humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan remain alive -- particularly because the Communist Party finds such memories useful. China's modern view of foreigners and their intentions is necessarily refracted through the prism of such history.
Perhaps inevitably, the recent anti-Japanese rage during the Asian Cup left most Japanese with a strong sense of China as an irreconcilably unfriendly nation. As usual, Japan's government reacted meekly, offering superficial complaints about China to assuage domestic displeasure. But these complaints fail a vital diplomatic test -- preservation of national dignity, prestige and the honor of one's citizens.
So how should Japan respond? Should Japan fight fire with fire?
Part of the problem lies in Japan's educational system. Owing to a curriculum controlled by the Japan Teachers Union, since the end of World War II many Japanese youth have viewed the Japan-China relationship with a consciousness of the need for atonement for the Sino-Japanese War. Today, however, calls are growing to promote a more accurate and balanced historical education that focuses on modern history after the Meiji Restoration and World War II, and that reflects the reality of the Sino-Japanese relationship free from an obsession with "atonement."
Obviously, calls for greater balance in historical education raise the specter of reactionary overkill: either complete affirmation of past Japanese conduct or other forms of anti-Chinese bias. But the majority of reform advocates seek something else: fairness and objectivity in history education, including studying the differences between Japan and China in their historical interpretations of the Sino-Japanese War.
Equally important, unlike the subject of World War II, Japanese history education barely addresses the two countries' postwar relations. Japanese textbooks, indeed, hardly touch upon the enormous economic aid that Japan has given to China -- which, not surprisingly, is ignored completely in China's history curriculum.
But the issue goes beyond education. Coerced into feeling the need to atone to China, Japan passively tolerated recent episodes of worrying Chinese behavior. This attitude contributed to inattention by Japan's political, administrative, academic and media elite toward China's unlawful advance toward Japanese territories and neighboring waters, including Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
China's recent and recurrent actions -- such as ocean surveys for economic and military purposes, conducted without notification by navy or survey ships in Japanese territorial or EEZ waters -- have, however, finally awakened Japan's elite from its inertia.
In response, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party established a Working Team on the Protection of Maritime Interests. Based on the team's recommendations, the government established an inter-ministerial commission on the survey of continental shelves and maritime resources. The Japanese media's attention to the issue has also grown.
More is at stake than maritime interests. With a revision of Japan's National Defense Program expected by year's end, the prime minister's Council on Security and Defense Capabilities has indicated a need to respond to China's military expansion, particularly its buildup of armed forces.
"China is now in the stage of surging nationalism, and the trend is expected to continue in the future," the council warned in its interim report, concluding that "Japan must take appropriate actions in response to each incident" in which China attempts to "gradually advance its defense line" oceanward.
Japan seems to be departing from its conventional low-profile diplomacy toward China, and readying itself to construct a comprehensive long-term national and regional security strategy. The military core of such a strategy must include appropriate maritime tactics to respond to China's aggressiveness. But ultimately the effectiveness and success of such a strategy will depend on how Japan positions itself in the region, especially in the relationship with China.
The Asian Football Cup highlighted not only China's growing nationalism, but also the perilous state of relations with Japan. A glimpse of the silent rage of China's populace has awakened Japan to the need for a comprehensive regional strategy.
Hideaki Kaneda, a retired vice admiral in Japan's Self Defense Forces, is director of the Okazaki Institute. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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