The activities of Chinese oceanographic surveillance ships close to Japanese territorial waters are aimed at challenging US interests in the West Pacific, Premier Yu Shyi-kun said in New York a few days ago, calling China a "source of disorder."
In fact, China has engaged in marine surveillance in the waters close to Japan as early as 1995, focusing on three regions. The first region is the center of the area claimed by Japan along the "medium line" dividing Chinese and Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea. Japanese officials argue that since the continental shelf extends to the trench south of the Ryukyu island chain, rights to the shelf should be divided equally by Japan and China along a line equidistant to the two nations.
However, Chinese officials argue that the continental shelf ends at the Okinawa trough and that China should have jurisdiction up to that trough. The second region is the area stretching from the East China Sea through the Miyako Strait to the Pacific Ocean, and the third region is the waters around the Diaoyutai islands (called the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese).
Shigeo Hiramatsu, a well-known Japanese military expert, believes China is experiencing an oil shortage due to its rapid modernization, and that the frequent surveys in the waters around Japan are aimed at locating underwater oil deposits.
On the other hand, according to the "blue-water naval strategy" proposed in 1993 by Liu Huaqing (劉華清), a former first vice-chairman of China's Central Military Commission, the Chinese navy must move its defense from the coastline to the first chain of outlying islands -- Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia -- and maybe even to the second chain of islands in the West Pacific -- Ogasawara-shoto, Iwo Jima, the Mariana Islands and the Palau Islands. It is obvious that China is trying to project its military force into the Pacific east of Taiwan. Such a move would make it possible for missiles fired from Chinese nuclear-powered submarines to reach the US. It would be a convenient way of restraining the US-Japanese alliance.
As the Chinese economy has been growing stronger, China's attempts to enhance its influence in East Asia has become clearer. Faced with survival issues such as an expanding population and environmental deterioration, China's development into the Pacific seems necessary. In 1992, the Standing Committee of the People's Congress adopted the "Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," which codified an unprecedented view of the ocean, saying that "ocean territory is an important part of China's living space." Based on a geopolitical analysis, China's power is land-based. The series of islands from Kyushu to Nansei-shoto in Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines separate China from the Pacific and blocks a possible extension of China's influence to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, India and Pakistan.
If, therefore, China wants to become an ocean-faring nation and a global force, it has to eliminate these negative geographical factors and the restrictions placed on it by Taiwan, to reach the Pacific Ocean. This means that Japan's sea lanes will come under threat. For Japan, the South China Sea and the waters off Taiwan are vital for transporting oil and other important strategic resources.
A 1996 long-term forecast of the security situation and Japan's proper defense preparations by the National Institute for Defense Studies under the Japan Defense Agency points out that the shipping lanes running through the Malacca Strait and the Bashi Strait will come under threat if China were to become an economic, military and political superpower.
With its growing influence in the region, it can be predicted that China will become the major force in East Asia if Japan continues to avoid taking on the role as the major military force in the area.
The main target was of course not only North Korea, which US President George W. Bush has called a member of an "axis of evil." It seemed also to be aimed at restricting China's influence in the region and preventing it from becoming a regional instability factor. It has been reported that the Japan Defense Agency has decided to amend its "Outline for National Defense Program" to substitute the Cold War concept of a Soviet invasion with prevention of an invasion by guerrilla troops and spy boats in response to China's intensified activities in the waters around Nansei-shoto near Okinawa.
As a result, the focus of troop deployments will be shifted from the north to the south.
In response, a worried China has said that the focus of Japan's military strategy will shift from "homeland defense" to "overseas intervention," and that Japan will emulate the US and tighten its containment of China by expanding the scope of cooperation within the US-Japanese military alliance, surrounding China on three sides and posing a serious threat to its security. China has pointed out that Japan is interfering politically with the resolution of the Taiwan issue, and that, together with the US, Tokyo is trying to bring Taiwan into the alliance, making a solution to the cross-strait issue even more difficult.
There is evidence that Japan has realized that post-Cold War China, with its rapidly developing economy and national strength, has become a great international power, and the problems with handling their relationship will become increasingly obvious. In addition, many Japanese feel that their government should take an even tougher stance toward China. In particular, when offering economic assistance, Japan should make clear the threat posed to Japan by China's increased military spending. This argument is gaining currency, and will affect the Japanese government's future diplomatic relations with China, since public opinion in democratic countries will be reflected in government policy in the end.
Ho Szu-shen is an associate professor in the Department of Japanese at Fu-jen Catholic University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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