The heads of state and government of NATO's 26 member nations gathered in Istanbul for a major summit. The symbolism of a city that bridges two continents was especially appropriate. In Istanbul, we not only reinforced the alliance's vital transatlantic link, but also built bridges of cooperation to other regions. After the discord over Iraq, the summit demonstrated a new momentum in transatlantic security cooperation and reinforced NATO's role as the major instrument for that cooperation. The key decisions that we took at the summit make this very clear.
First, Afghanistan: NATO decided in Istanbul to expand its stabilizing presence. We will increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to support the expansion of the central government's authority and facilitate development and reconstruction. We will also provide enhanced support for the forthcoming elections, which are crucial to ensuring long-term peace and stability and making sure that the country will never again become a safe haven for terrorists.
Second, Iraq: at the request of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, NATO decided to offer to help train Iraqi security forces. In addition to our continued support for Poland in its leadership of the multinational division in Iraq, NATO will now play a distinct role in helping Iraq. That this decision was taken in conjunction with the transfer of authority to a new Iraqi government only adds to its significance. The allies affirmed unambiguously that a stable Iraq is in their common interest and that NATO is part of achieving this. Training is an area that is critical to Iraq's stability, and one in which NATO has valuable experience and expertise to share.
Third, the Balkans: while our presence in Kosovo remains unchanged, the much improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina allows us to conclude our successful mission there by the end of this year. The EU will then follow with a mission of its own, and we will support the EU in this endeavor. But NATO will retain a presence in Sarajevo, in particular to help Bosnia and Herzegovina with defense reform. We want to welcome this country, as well as Serbia and Montenegro, into our Partnership for Peace program as soon as they meet the relevant criteria, which include full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Fourth, military transformation: the allies decided to accelerate their efforts to equip NATO with the forces and technologies it needs to perform 21st century missions from the Balkans to Afghanistan. The NATO Response Force will soon achieve its initial operational capability, and our new Multinational Defense Battalion dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats is fully operational -- all ideas proposed by the US, and implemented rapidly by the alliance. We also endorsed mea-sures to strengthen the link between political agreement to commence operations and the provision of necessary forces, including through usability targets and changes to NATO's planning processes.
Fifth, NATO enlargement and partnership: although the Istanbul summit was the first to include NATO's seven new member countries -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia -- we gave a strong signal that the door remains open, and encouraged those who want to join to continue pursuing the reforms needed to make themselves ready for membership. We also launched a new phase in our relations with partner countries: opportunities for more individualized cooperation, a greater emphasis on defense reform and a stronger focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Furthermore, we welcomed the interest shown by Russia and Ukraine in contributing to "Active Endeavor," our anti-terrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean, as another sign of the growing strategic value of our partnership with these countries.
Finally, the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East: NATO decided in Istanbul to reach out to new regions of strategic importance, in particular the broader Middle East. No other region's development will affect our security more profoundly in coming years. We need a coherent transatlantic effort to engage this region, and NATO will be part of that effort. We agreed to strengthen our Mediterranean Dialogue with seven countries in North Africa and the Middle East and to transform it into a genuine partnership. We also launched the "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" to offer practical security-related cooperation to countries in the broader Middle East. Several members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have already expressed an interest in working together with NATO, so we are off to a good start.
The NATO Istanbul summit was a strong demonstration of an Atlanticism that looks to the challenges of today and tomorrow and is prepared to tackle security challenges wherever they emerge. The summit gave NATO more political and military means to project stability where it matters. Most importantly, the summit reaffirmed the role of the transatlantic community of democratic nations and shared values as the most powerful force for shaping our future.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is secretary general of NATO.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath