The US preoccupation with Iraq and global terrorism has given China an ideal opportunity to expand its role. In Southeast Asia it has forged a free-trade agreement with ASEAN. It has also signed a "Strategic Partnership" agreement with the regional organization. Although the partnership is supposedly "non-aligned, non-military and non-exclusive," it has a wide scope to cover almost anything and everything. For instance, it calls for cooperation in "politics, economy, social affairs, security and regional affairs."
On the surface, China's regional diplomacy is not directed against the US. Indeed, according to Vice Premier Qian Qichen (
First, by enlarging its political and economic space in the region through multilateral forums, Beijing will make it increasingly difficult for Washington to enlist regional support against China in the future.
Second, by virtue of its membership and or cooperation in the regional forums, it would have assured itself a seat in the conduct of regional affairs. And because of its political and economic weight, it will have a leading, if not determining, role.
In the longer run, China has a larger ambition of forging and leading an East Asian community. As a Chinese diplomat has put it, "China sees its integration with Southeast Asia as part of the East Asia pact." He added: "If you look at the world today, you see Europe with its integration having grown for many years now. And you look at North America and NAFTA. Look at Southeast Asia, we still lack this."
Beijing, though, makes it sound like it is doing it for Asia's common good. But the real objective is to establish China's pre-eminence. Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅), blurted it out some time ago when he told China Daily that regional economic cooperation "will serve as a helpful trial and practice of China's new security concept featuring comprehensive, common and cooperative security."
Interestingly, there is a regional audience for the new Chinese initiative for regional integration. Mari Pangestu, an Indonesian economist has put it this way: "The growth of China led to a growing realization that the region could form a large and dynamic economic bloc ? and seek a more effective voice in the global arena hitherto dominated by Western interests."
China's charm diplomacy continues to reinforce this sense. Speaking at an Asian forum last year, Premier Wen Jiabao (
Whatever China's own agenda, this kind of charm offensive appears a welcome contrast in the region to the US policy of making terrorism the litmus test of all international relationships. China is, therefore, emerging as a benign power. As a Thai defense analyst has said, "China seems to become more and more of an attractive option," especially when it is increasingly projected as an economic powerhouse.
In reality China is recreating imperial Japan's East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of the 1930s and 1940s. Like Japan at the time, China too feels the need for assured markets and raw materials to sustain its economic growth and project power. But in today's world, it cannot follow the ways of the old empires to expand territorially.
Fu Ying, China's new ambassador in Australia, has sought to put it in perspective in an interview. She said, "There is a fear about the future orientation of Chinese foreign policy. It's not surprising, because in world history many big powers rose and caused earthquakes. But I think China is going to be different, because the world has changed. It is not like in the past when powers had to expand territorially in order to get markets.?"
Therefore, Beijing will do it differently by forging one big happy East Asian community. It will include Southeast and Northeast Asia with China at the center. It will be like the old Middle Kingdom all over again with its modern version of tributary Asian states providing easy access to their markets and materials.
China also has a place for Japan and Korea in its long-term plan. Japan, though, might be a problem because: one, it is part of the US security system and two, it is a regional political and economic rival. But that might not be an insurmountable problem were Japan to feel marginalized from an Asian initiative. It might then want to be inside the Asian club If everything were to work according to the Chinese script, the US might find itself politically eased out of the Asia-Pacific region over a period of time.
As it is, things are not looking too good for the US. It is knee-eep in the Iraqi quagmire, notwithstanding the transfer of sovereignty routine. Its "imperial overstretch" is helping China to spread its tentacles further into Asia at US cost. James Steinberg, a foreign policy analyst at the US' Brookings Institution, regards this "as a zero-sum game." In his view, "If their [China's] power is greater, it diminishes ours. If [regional] countries have relations with China, they'll do less to help us. There will be less support on US bases" and so on.
China obviously has grandiose plans for its great power role, but it is not always that simple and neat. Some of its neighbors are not likely to take kindly to China's expanding role. They will, therefore, always welcome a US presence in the region to balance or deter China. Besides, China has a long way to go to replace the US as the regional and or global economic powerhouse. Equally, as the world's second-largest economy, Japan will not be easily subsumed into any Chinese grand plan.
China's biggest problem is its archaic Marxist-Leninist political system. The deeply embedded contradiction between its relatively open economy and closed political system (already dead in its Soviet homeland) is akin to a superstructure built on a sandy foundation. There is no knowing how long it will last. And when it does crumble, the country will become preoccupied with its internal problems.
Already, China is said to be racked with a number of small and big protests in its rural and regional backyard. All China's initiatives abroad are, therefore, hostage to a flawed political system at home.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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