China's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a seven-point statement three days before President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration on May 20. The statement was generally seen as a combination of carrot and stick. Opposition parties and anti-Chen activists emphasized the stick, claiming that a war might break out if Chen did not affirm the "one China" principle in his speech.
However, if China was truly in a rush to unify Taiwan, then, after saying those cruel words, would it have humbly asked Taipei to admit that "there is only one China in the world?" Or that what China strives for is merely "the future prosperity of peaceful reunification of the motherland?"
Neither Taipei's recognition of "one China" nor Beijing's pursuit of future prosperity is an urgent enough matter to trigger a cross-strait war. I have no intention of offending China's leaders over their beliefs and dedication in pursuing reunification. The leaders who rule this major Asian power are not so stupid that they cannot distinguish "tactics" from "strategy." Beijing would have ignored Chen's speech if it had no hope for him. So why did it issue the statement three days before the inauguration? There were obviously tactics involved.
A person once deeply involved in the triangular relationship of Taiwan, China and the US privately revealed that "in light of its timing, Beijing's statement was clearly made to Washington." After his re-election, Chen sent then Presidential Office secretary-general Chiou I-jen (邱義仁) and then Mainland Affairs Council chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to the US, where they explained the speech to Washington.
As one corner of the triangular relationship, Washington would have informed Beijing of Taipei's attitude. This is exactly why officials from the Presidential Office said that Beijing was aware of the speech's content in advance.
Beijing therefore issued the statement right after midnight of May 16 -- nine hours before a new working week began in Taiwan, 21 hours before it began in Washington. This allowed Taiwan and the US to have sufficient time to communicate before Taipei could deliver its message to Beijing through Washington.
Beijing was not unconcerned about Chen's remarks. It was dissatisfied with the creation of a new constitution that Chen was about to discuss. The statement was therefore issued to push Washington to "adjust" its content in the remaining three days.
From a tactical perspective, we should not exaggerate the sense of threat, thinking that China might have fired its missiles if Chen did not mention "one China." Our observations should focus on Chen's discussion of a new constitution.
Was Chen's discussion of this issue acceptable to Washington? -- that is, was the wording good enough so that Washington could force Beijing to swallow it?
A tactical mistake may also have occured here. Previously, the three countries had kept private communication channels open until then president Lee Teng-hui (
After Chen took office in 2000, Taipei's channels to Beijing and even Washington closed. Since Taipei and Washington could no longer communicate with each other over and under the table simultaneously, there may have been a gap between official statements and subtle messages delivered to Beijing via Washington. With the Taipei-Beijing channels both over and under the table closed, it was even more difficult for the two sides to fully understand each other.
Tactically speaking, Taipei is at a disadvantage today, as it must rely on Washington when negotiating the triangular relationship. Meanwhile, due to a lack of private channels, Washington has been suspicious about the credibility of the messages from Taipei, which requests that Washington deliver and endorse its messages while not being cognizant of their meaning.
Let us put aside the tactical issue. The fundamental problem lies in "one China." Although Chinese President Hu Jintao's (
Beijing was not so naive to think that Chen would directly say yes or no to "one China" on May 20. But if Chen really views "one China" as an option, he must make it a negotiable goal. Emphasizing the "Republic of China" is a passive method. Instead, he has to build a "one China" discourse that can influence China's thinking -- as was the case with Lee's controversial "seven regions theory," the confederation theory and the "one China, two seats" formula. But if Chen won't take the initiative, he can only rely on Washington to define the status quo.
Ku Er-teh is a freelance writer.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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