Taipei Times: Now that President Chen Shui-bian (
Chu Hei-yuan (
TT: What do you think are the underlying reasons for the failure of the referendum topics to gather enough votes to pass?
ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
Chu: It was due to at least three things -- KMT and PFP opposition, Chinese opposition and the design of the referendum topics. In view of fact that both referendum topics have been defeated, despite Chen's re-election, Chinese pressure and intimidation seem to have worked on some people, even among Chen's supporters. As for the referendum questions, they have inherent problems. They are not only illogical and contradictory, but also irrelevant. This is especially true about the second topic, which is a two-part question. The Chen administration did not dare to ask the really important question -- should Taiwan declare independence or accept unification? Instead, they asked the wrong questions.
TT: Although the referendum topics have been voted down, has Chen nevertheless established a special role or position in the history of Taiwan as a result of pushing through the referendum?
Chu: Had the referendum been on the unification-independence issue, then yes -- he may have attained a special role in history, regardless of whether the topics had been approved. However, since this referendum was no more than a symbolic gesture, due to the poor design of the questions, he is not likely to retain any special role in history for it. If, after this referendum and despite its defeat, one thing eventually leads to another and Taiwan achieves independence, then perhaps Chen may earn recognition in history.
TT: How will the referendum results impact the future of referendums in Taiwan?
Chu: Regardless of the result, meaning even if the referendum topics had been approved, the referendum could become the last of its kind. Of course, success this time around might have somewhat facilitated the development of referendums. However, defeat now is certainly going to have a negative impact. After all, it should not be forgotten that Chen's government relied on Article 17 of the Referendum Law (
The substantive provisions of the law make it extremely difficult -- virtually impossible -- to hold referendums.
First and foremost, the legislative review committee, from which approval is needed in order to hold a referendum, might continue to be composed primarily of members of the pan-blue camp, which has been hostile to referendums to begin with.
The Taipei Society (
TT: Will this all change if the power balance between the pan-green and pan-blue camps in the Legislative Yuan changes as a result of the legislative elections at the end of the year?
Chu: We might not have to wait that long for change. Now that Chen has been re-elected, he may be able to organize the "national security alliance" he has talked about. With the defeat of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), a feud is likely to erupt between the two and their parties. Their cooperation is likely to end. Moreover, the native Taiwanese faction or camp of the KMT may defect to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or otherwise form some sort of alliance with the DPP. If only a few -- maybe 10 or so -- pan-blue lawmakers join forces with the pan-green camp, the pan-green camp will have a legislative majority, and the power balance within the Legislative Yuan will shift. [Editor's note: the decision of the KMT-PFP alliance to ask for a recount of the votes in the presidential election has added a degree of uncertainty to developments concerning the interplay between the two parties, as well as within the KMT.]
TT: Had the referendum topics been approved, what kind of message would have been sent to the world, and how might that have impacted political developments and the cross-strait relationship over the next four years?
Chu: It would have been a powerful, strong and clear declaration of Taiwan's sovereignty and identity, a call for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Strait issue and an announcement not only to China, but also to the world in general that Taiwan opposes Chinese missiles.
However, the result of such a declaration would have been unpredictable. Would the US, China and Japan have accepted the results? We may never know. The most critical thing would of course be China's stance toward Taiwan, which may either soften or harden. China might have hardened its position if it interpreted the election and referendum results as proving the inevitability of Taiwanese independence. Beijing might have escalated its military coercion and diplomatic blockade of Taiwan.
As for the US' attitude, it would have depended on the attitude of China. If China softened its stance, the US would try to push for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue. If China hardened its position, the US would try not to upset or provoke China too much.
Of course, if US President George W. Bush was still the president -- that is, if he is re-elected, too -- the US may take a more hard-line position toward China. The attitude of the US would of course be important, because Taiwan depends on the US very much, and therefore there would be infinite ways for the US to exert pressure on Taiwan, be it economically, militarily or diplomatically.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath