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Voting strengthened the nation's identity, but the referendum added little

Sunday, Mar 21, 2004, Page 23

ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE

Taipei Times: Now that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has been re-elected by a narrow margin but the referendum topics have not been approved, how will this impact the political development of Taiwan for the next four years?

Chu Hei-yuan (瞿海源): The credibility of Chen as a leader under the circumstances is weakened and injured. This is not to mention the very dire consequences for the cross-strait relationship. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait will probably continue to be deadlocked and at an impasse, which is going to be hard to break. The Chen administration will now have even less confidence in handling the cross-strait relationship. It will be unable either to move forward or to backtrack, thus becoming trapped in a difficult position.

TT: What do you think are the underlying reasons for the failure of the referendum topics to gather enough votes to pass?

Chu: It was due to at least three things -- KMT and PFP opposition, Chinese opposition and the design of the referendum topics. In view of fact that both referendum topics have been defeated, despite Chen's re-election, Chinese pressure and intimidation seem to have worked on some people, even among Chen's supporters. As for the referendum questions, they have inherent problems. They are not only illogical and contradictory, but also irrelevant. This is especially true about the second topic, which is a two-part question. The Chen administration did not dare to ask the really important question -- should Taiwan declare independence or accept unification? Instead, they asked the wrong questions.

TT: Although the referendum topics have been voted down, has Chen nevertheless established a special role or position in the history of Taiwan as a result of pushing through the referendum?

Chu: Had the referendum been on the unification-independence issue, then yes -- he may have attained a special role in history, regardless of whether the topics had been approved. However, since this referendum was no more than a symbolic gesture, due to the poor design of the questions, he is not likely to retain any special role in history for it. If, after this referendum and despite its defeat, one thing eventually leads to another and Taiwan achieves independence, then perhaps Chen may earn recognition in history.

TT: How will the referendum results impact the future of referendums in Taiwan?

Chu: Regardless of the result, meaning even if the referendum topics had been approved, the referendum could become the last of its kind. Of course, success this time around might have somewhat facilitated the development of referendums. However, defeat now is certainly going to have a negative impact. After all, it should not be forgotten that Chen's government relied on Article 17 of the Referendum Law (公民投票法) [which gives the president the power to call a referendum in the event of a threat to national sovereignty, without getting the approval of the Legislative Yuan], which is not something that can be easily repeated.

The substantive provisions of the law make it extremely difficult -- virtually impossible -- to hold referendums.

First and foremost, the legislative review committee, from which approval is needed in order to hold a referendum, might continue to be composed primarily of members of the pan-blue camp, which has been hostile to referendums to begin with.

The Taipei Society (澄社) planned to push for the reform and restructuring of the Legislative Yuan through a referendum, but discovered that that this would be a major project, requiring the signatures of at least 700,000 people and the crossing of other hurdles as well.

TT: Will this all change if the power balance between the pan-green and pan-blue camps in the Legislative Yuan changes as a result of the legislative elections at the end of the year?

Chu: We might not have to wait that long for change. Now that Chen has been re-elected, he may be able to organize the "national security alliance" he has talked about. With the defeat of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜), a feud is likely to erupt between the two and their parties. Their cooperation is likely to end. Moreover, the native Taiwanese faction or camp of the KMT may defect to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or otherwise form some sort of alliance with the DPP. If only a few -- maybe 10 or so -- pan-blue lawmakers join forces with the pan-green camp, the pan-green camp will have a legislative majority, and the power balance within the Legislative Yuan will shift. [Editor's note: the decision of the KMT-PFP alliance to ask for a recount of the votes in the presidential election has added a degree of uncertainty to developments concerning the interplay between the two parties, as well as within the KMT.]

TT: Had the referendum topics been approved, what kind of message would have been sent to the world, and how might that have impacted political developments and the cross-strait relationship over the next four years?

Chu: It would have been a powerful, strong and clear declaration of Taiwan's sovereignty and identity, a call for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Strait issue and an announcement not only to China, but also to the world in general that Taiwan opposes Chinese missiles.

However, the result of such a declaration would have been unpredictable. Would the US, China and Japan have accepted the results? We may never know. The most critical thing would of course be China's stance toward Taiwan, which may either soften or harden. China might have hardened its position if it interpreted the election and referendum results as proving the inevitability of Taiwanese independence. Beijing might have escalated its military coercion and diplomatic blockade of Taiwan.

As for the US' attitude, it would have depended on the attitude of China. If China softened its stance, the US would try to push for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue. If China hardened its position, the US would try not to upset or provoke China too much.

Of course, if US President George W. Bush was still the president -- that is, if he is re-elected, too -- the US may take a more hard-line position toward China. The attitude of the US would of course be important, because Taiwan depends on the US very much, and therefore there would be infinite ways for the US to exert pressure on Taiwan, be it economically, militarily or diplomatically.
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