Six illegal migrants from China drowned after being thrown overboard outside Tunghsiao, Miaoli County, on Aug. 26. Apart from expressing our condolences for the families of the deceased and indignation towards the human traffickers, people from both Taiwan and China should consider how to keep similar tragedies from occurring.
Due to the political dispute between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the two governments have seen poor results in areas where they could have worked together to strengthen security.
Unfortunately, the two sides have yet to reach a consensus or build a foundation of trust, goodwill, cooperation and effective management upon which talks to deal with cross-strait crimes can rest.
Snakeheads have a long history of smuggling people from China to Taiwan. Given the lack of controls along China's coast, it is hard to rule out the possibility of some corrupt Chinese government officials collaborating with these human traffickers, making it difficult for the Taiwanese government to hunt them down.
Beijing's poor cooperation in repatriating these illegal immigrants has caused Taiwan's detention centers to become overcrowded. Although sneaking into Taiwan from China is deemed a criminal act by the Chinese government, Beijing is unwilling to assist in the repatriation work on the basis of humanitarian principles. This kind of ruthless government is surely a rarity.
As the Mid-Autumn Festival draws near, we call on Beijing to speed up its efforts to repatriate these illegal entrants so that they may reunite with their families before this important holiday.
If agencies in Taiwan and China cooperate to stop these human traffickers by adopting effective deterrence and strengthening security checks along China's coastline to prevent illegal migrants from boarding the boats, similar tragedies are less likely to occur.
As for Taiwan's crackdown on smuggling, the nation should reinforce its airborne reconnaissance and mobility (for example, helicopters and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft are a must) to build up three-dimensional detecting abilities between land, water and air. This would effectively lower the success of smugglers, thus deterring them and preventing its occurrence.
Although cross-strait acrimony is commonplace, Beijing adopts different principles with direct links than with political issues. I wonder whether this should also be applied to cooperation to eradicate crimes at sea.
Furthermore, if Beijing can dismantle some of the missiles aimed at Taiwan and use the money to improve the lives of the Chinese people, I believe its efforts will be conducive to the common security of Taiwan and China.
Chang Pai-ta is acting deputy chief of DPP's China Affairs Department.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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