The question of whether Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), who had just taken up their positions when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) exploded onto the stage in China, will pass the test has become the focus of attention among political observers.
This is particularly so since former president and Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin (
In the eyes of the masses, the real transfer of power took place at the Communist Party of China's 16th National Congress last year. The National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference convened earlier this year were seen only as providing formal endorsement of that transfer. Beginning last year, talk about a fourth period of ideological liberation started to emerge.
Following the onset of reform in China, there have been three periods of ideological liberation -- beginning with the onset of reforms in 1978, the speeches given by Deng Xiaoping (
The policy decisions taken during these three periods all led to quite intense debate within the leadership. The idea of three periods of ideological liberation began gaining currency as a result of a controversial book, Crossing Swords -- A Record of Three Periods of Ideological Liberation in Contemporary China (交鋒 -- 當代中國三次思想解放實錄), written in 1998 by two People's Daily reporters, Ma Licheng (馬立誠) and Ling Zhijun (凌志軍).
A large part of the debate in China's non-official media regarding this fourth period of ideological liberalization is, in fact, preoccupied with the media's understanding of the workings of democracy in the US and Europe. This understanding includes the idea that the urban middle class, together with intellectuals, monitor the government. An urban middle class of sorts has emerged in the wake of China's economic development and it would seem that they might naturally take on this role.
Expectations of this fourth period of ideological liberation further include an improvement to the government's executive functions, an improved judicial system -- in particular the contentious issue of promulgating a civil code, since China today only has general provisions for civil law, with property rights, marriage and inheritance laws yet to be codified -- and the establishment of non-governmental organizations in order to form a Chinese civil society. In addition to the idea of universal direct elections, almost all these understandings come from Europe and the US.
But will Hu be able to meet these media expectations? SARS has conveniently shown the structure of political and social mobilization in China to have remained almost unchanged amidst economic development. Media expectations on a fourth period of ideological liberalization are basically built on the premise that the democracies of today developed by focusing in on the individual.
SARS information and preventive mobilization in China, however, is still basically based on China's already existing units.
"Unit" is an important concept for anyone wanting to understand China. By comparison, it's a little bit like having to understand Taiwan's local factions to be able to understand Taiwanese politics.
The concrete effects of the unit, however, are much more far-reaching. Judging from Mao Zedong's (
Following China's all-out marketization, the unit has gained even more influence over the salaries and welfare of people inside the unit. Since almost every unit is capable of marketization and commercialization, the welfare of people inside the unit is dependent on the fortunes of the unit. The absolutely most important issue for the people inside the unit is whether they can get an even better price on housing built by the unit (prices are determined by the unit).
Almost every person in China belongs to a unit, even someone working in a non-Chinese com-pany. The difference is that the true boss of someone working in a foreign-invested company is that company. A foreign-invested company also belongs to some unit, but that unit is only responsible for managing personnel files.
Since the unit is such an important part of daily life, it actually increases the distance between people in general and the government. Given this situation, the fourth ideological liberalization that the media is looking forward to will remain a castle in the air unless Hu is able to handle the unit.
Feeling the pulse of public opinion, Hu has not been inactive. Even as the minister of health and the Beijing mayor were dismissed over the SARS issue, China Central Television began to promote the concept of a "service-style government" that both responds to public opinion and stiffens its resolve to control the SARS situation.
All this, however, is of no help to Hu in dealing with the crisis he is currently facing. He lost the chance to set the agenda at the outset, when Wen was still saying that China was fully confident that it would be able to contain the virus even as the situation was worsening in Beijing. Today, therefore, Hu and Wen are simply executing the decisions of the Politburo. Hu is left with no retreat, and has no way forward. His only hope is to maintain the status quo.
Severe acute Chinese politics are just about to begin and distribution of power is at the mercy of the SARS virus.
Hsu Tung-ming is a freelance writer based in Beijing.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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