Disputes over media evaluations and newspaper surveys have been replaced by a discussion over whether the Government Information Office (GIO) should be abolished.
At the same time, the establishment of an independent broadcasting commission has once again become the focus of public opinion.
Ever since the previous government planned the establishment of a unified information, communications and broadcasting authority, blueprints for both the Telecommunications, Information and Broadcasting Commission and the National Communications Commission have been modeled on the US' Federal Communications Commission, (FCC).
These blueprints have highlighted the expertise and independent status of commission members, matched by a selection procedure offering the highest standards and the vast administrative resources of a ministerial-level authority. With both the former and the present government's organizational reform and "small is beautiful" concept, the major undertaking of elevating an authority in this way and expanding its top-level organization is bound to be looked upon with disapproval by the ministries and commissions that have already been combined with other units.
The total production value of telecommunications, computer network or broadcasting-related industries should not be neglected, but the selfish thinking that there should be a ministry for each industry does not fit in with the the late 20th century universal international trend toward streamlining government organizations.
The intense discussion regarding the continued existence of the GIO is speeding up the formation of this new authority intended to unify and take over the management of telecommunications and broadcasting issues. The latest version, the Communications and Broadcasting Commission, is looking gradually less like the FCC, instead constantly taking on more and more design concepts from other countries.
One major change is the adoption of the Fair Trade Commission framework, an organization that already possesses localization experience. What's more, the scope of the authority's powers transcends the "independent [telecommunications] supervisory authority" suggested by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and it is instead modelling itself on the UK's Office of Communications (Ofcom) and its content controls.
For organizational establishment, it is moving toward the "principles for establishing independent institutions" promulgated by the Cabinet.
I'll leave aside the discussion regarding what kind of design concepts should be included in this kind of international standards blueprint. Staff, organizational and regulatory standards of a future Communications and Broadcasting Commission will be fully "made in Taiwan." They will not be made of the same "materials" as the FCC or the Ofcom. On the other hand, there will be no obvious differences between the political and economic background or the party ideology surrounding this dreamlike building -- hurriedly erected out of thin air -- and the current situation.
Putting it in plain language, regardless of what kind of experts this new authority will be able to hire to lead it, how high its status will be or how much its independence is highlighted, each stage, from staff election process and setting of priorities to procedures for reviewing individual cases, will have to deal with the conflict between the opposition and the ruling party, populist policies and lobbying by privileged people.
Given these conditions, the status of this new authority will be very similar to that of the Legislative Yuan -- it will be bestowed with decision-making powers, and uncertain and contradictory duties. In particular, it will have to manage the recent and utterly confusing issue of quality control by directly crossing swords with the media. This causes us to worry and wonder how its independence shall be maintained.
This author has previously used the Aviation Safety Council as an example to explain that the creation of semi-judicial procedures and placing importance on careful assessment of the veracity of evidence are important factors for independent institutions relying on expertise to guarantee that independence. In fact, the OECD is concerned over the fairness of market competition following a fundamental de-regulation, privatization and internationalization of communications operations and it is suggesting that each nation set up an independent organization to manage the situation.
The most important benchmark is that it is separate from policymaking ministries and authorities within the executive structure. Today, the strictly supervisory authority originaly directed by the Directorate General of Telecommunications is being upgraded by adding decision-making functions and the content control duties of the GIO's Radio & Television Affairs Department.
Judging from the flood of protests resulting from the GIO's measures to strengthen supervision of the media, a future Communications and Broadcasting Commission will -- apart from having to resist lobbying pressure from the telecommunications and information industries with their huge total production value -- also find itself hovering between vociferous public opinion and a wave of popular culture for the sake of around-the-clock multi-frequency broadcasting of innumerable video and audio signals.
Assuming that this new authority really can achieve the same independent status within the executive structure as has the US Fair Trade Commission, it will still not be able to avoid an endless stream of disputes as difficult to solve as the Microsoft issue, and many other disputes even harder to solve.
Therefore, adopting a commission-member selection procedure employing legal technicalities such as the flexible employment of experts, an independent budget and the elimination of administrative complaint procedures that may strengthen the design flaws of earlier blue prints. However, the new draft obviously cannot provide a prudent response to the real risks following from decision-making powers and media content control.
As for content control, as evidenced by the successful experience of constitutional democracies in Europe, the US and Japan, we will in the end become involved in glaring high-tech industrial policies unless we at an early stage are able to introduce a media structure policy that, by balancing public and private through benevolent competition, places the main focus on self-censorship and a secondary focus on public supervision.
Howard Shyr is a professor in the Institute of Financial and Economic Law at National Dong Hwa University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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