War can change a country. It can even change even the entire world. As the US-UK coalition forces are sweeping across Iraq, Washington is not only changing its principles for using force but also creating a brand new warfare system. Amid the "shock and awe" gunfire, a new fight for hegemony over both land and sea has quietly begun, waiting to become the new face of global geostrategy once the US-led war on Iraq ends.
The "land power" ideology has deeply affected the strategic designs of European and Asian countries ever since British geostrategist Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) proposed the concept of a European "heartland" in the 19th Century. Occupying Europe's "heartland" -- Eastern Europe and central Russia -- as well as gradually extending power to the sea, became every country's goals.
In response to the potential threat brought about by the above concept, US strategist Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) proposed the concept of "sea power." Mahan believed that US security would likely be threatened mainly by the land powers in Europe and Asia, and that it was therefore necessary to build a defense line along the rim of Europe and Asia so as to ensure US security.
As a result of the appearance of these two ideologies, the struggles for land and sea supremacy led to two world wars. After World War II, the US also built the strategy of "containment" based on these concepts, which has influenced US principles for using force ever since the Cold War era.
The US adopted the strategy of deterrence as its principle for using force in the Cold War era. This strategy centered on "defense" in the hope of stopping the spread of communism. Nevertheless, the purpose of US military action in that era was to protect democratic countries from being invaded by communist countries. It did not intend to destroy other countries. Nor did it intend to overthrow other regimes.
After the Cold War ended, Washington adopted "the strategy of deterrence and containment" as its core strategy for containing regional conflicts that might spread within certain geographical regions. Thus, the US principle of using force still centered on "defense." It did not send troops overseas unless a foreign country invaded another. This also made it possible for the world's leading powers to be willing to send forces for peacekeeping purposes under the UN mechanism.
However, the US-Iraq war broke out after Washington replaced its traditional deterrence principle with a "pre-emptive strike" strategy. This has deeply threatened those major land powers. After all, a pre-emptive strike is offensive-oriented in nature and is different from conventional defense measures. The definition of an enemy is no longer ideology-oriented. Rather, it depends on the geographic strategic interests or threats of a nation to be attacked. Hence, if the land powers send troops to assist Washington this time, they themselves may also be defined as enemies and become targets after the war is over.
In this strategic situation, the fierce confrontation between the pro- and anti-war camps, caused by the US-Iraq war, shows that each country is basing its decisions on its strategic position -- not merely humanitarian concerns or oil interests. In fact, the US has become a security threat for the land powers after gaining a strategic position in Central Asia after the war in Afghanistan. If the US further obtains a strategic position of Iraq, it can easily control the land powers in the future.
As a result, a significant contrast can be seen between the anti-war land powers -- led by France, Germany, Russia and China -- and the pro-war countries -- led by the US and the UK and including Spain, Australia, Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan. Each of these nations quickly chose a side in the war according to its own geographic position. Backed by the support from those sea powers, the US has insisted on attacking Iraq based on its unilateralism.
In view of this strategic development, the reconstruction of Iraq will not be the only problem left behind by the war. The US will be faced with a completely altered international warfare system. If the land powers continue to actively confront the sea powers together for the sake of their geographic strategic interests, a fight for land and sea supremacy will certainly become the key to the world's warfare system in the future. It's not an ideological confrontation between democracy and communism, nor is it a clash of civilizations. Rather, it's a return to the traditional geopolitical contest.
Of course, given that all the warring sides took "offense as the best defense" in the two previous world wars, it will be hard to rule out a third world war in an era of traditional geopolitical contest.
Wang Kun-yi is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath