News reports and articles in the US media these past few weeks have referred to the anxiety found in the US among Taiwan watchers on just where Taiwan is going. Most of this coverage has focused on arms sales and the ability (and the will) of Taiwan to defend itself. These are, and should, be the first concern.
But the uncertainty goes beyond this to the nature of Taiwan's body politic today and how this might impact on the US-Taiwan relationship. Is it like what is taking place in Korea -- a fundamental change generated by the younger generation, or a lack of interest or knowledge on the part of the voters that could drastically alter that relationship?
There are, in Taiwan's body politic, ever fewer people who personally have experienced the cost of gaining their freedom under a democracy. This speaks not only to those older citizens who were either victims of the White Terror or of incarceration for their beliefs, but also to the literally millions who offered their low-cost labor in the building of its economy.
The perception abroad is that this generation seems to take what it has for granted and has little concern that these are not guaranteed rights -- rights that can be lost if they are not protected.
To be sure, there has been generational change everywhere, including in the US. Still, history, and values, remain a factor. One of the positive reactions to the Sept. 11 terrorist attack was the awakening of patriotic feelings among the younger generation that many of us thought had disappeared.
But, as usual, there is a difference when it comes to Taiwan. Patriotism means national loyalty -- always, therefore, there is the problem of national identity.
There may be another reason for this lack of concern over Taiwan's future by many in Taiwan, aside, that is, from those who hope for personal gain -- the clearer American commitment on Taiwan's security. This greater clarity, or reduced ambiguity, however one wants to describe it, was long sought by many of those few in the US who had responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. And certainly clarity was continuously sought by a great many in Taiwan who were, and still are, responsible for its security.
But one must remember that America's purpose in selling arms to Taiwan has always been to strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend itself and to strengthen its confidence in dealing with its adversary across the Strait. It is understood that America, in its own interest, had made several security commitments in East Asia and that its allies were very sensitive to how well these commitments were kept. The US would be unlikely, therefore, to permit the "loss" of Taiwan by allowing her to be militarily defeated. The confidence this has brought to Taiwan, however, seems to be going in an unanticipated direction.
The institutions that would normally at least hhelp counter-balance overconfidence on the part of the general public on security matters are the military, agencies that have national security responsibilities, think tanks and other non-governmental institutions.
Unfortunately, Taiwan is in the midst of reforming its national-security system and modernizing its military, and the going is very slow.
Leftover biases, differences over national identity, the recovery from some 50 years of military isolation and major political changes, still need time and much effort to complete.
At the same time, the incorporation of civilian personnel into the Ministry of National Defense and of civilian government agencies with legitimate security interests into the security policy-making process are also far from completion.
The result has been insufficient inter-ministry coordination. The rush to invest in China before the security implications of so doing had even been established is an example.
But, importantly, if judged by media attention, there seems to be little interest among the general public, and especially among young voters, on Taiwan's security situation.
Or perhaps, confident that the perceived American shield will take care of that, they believe there is no need to discuss it.
Much of these activities and issues, including the slow pace of reform, are normally considered domestic affairs. Why should any of this be seen as a matter of anxiety in the US?
On the US side, there is now a better understanding of how the government in Taiwan must operate as a democracy, but still more is needed. There is also, however, always the difficulty of managing this special relationship in the face of the importance of the US-China relationship, and the advantage in some important areas this gives to other countries who profit from it at the US' expense. There are the difficulties in managing the commitments made in the Taiwan Relations Act. Just as important, there is the commitment that any change in Taiwan's political status must have the assent of the people on Taiwan. All of these reasons have existed for some time without the anxiety that seems to have grown in more recent times. There is a growing perception that the passion to remain free from China's control, considered in America for some 50 years the fundamental reason for the commitment to Taiwan, is subsiding. The question is, then, to what extent is the perception accurate?
Any analysis of a democratic country's policies and activities is based on both the government's position, the views of experts and the media. It is clear that the flood of capital, technology and managers to China from Taiwan in the past two years has fundamentally altered Taiwan's relationship with China. It is also clear that the domestic political stalemate has prevented meaningful progress in addressing this and other problems. These are facts, and worrisome enough.
What has added greatly to the uncertainty about Taiwan that we read about are the perceptions that are not necessarily factual but add to a pessimistic analysis. The government has relatively reliable polls that show the people's views are quite different from what one reads and hears in much of the media. Yet the ability to get its views widely known domestically and abroad has been hampered by lack of experience and the dominance of the largely anti-government media. The doubts about open media reporting and the inability to get the government's views sufficiently known brings on the anxiety.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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