As China changed its rhetoric regarding direct links with Tai-wan and downplayed the phrase "one China," Taiwan's political parties were led to believe that the possibility of opening links has been enhanced as a result.
The change, however, is no surprise in terms of China's overall policy. With pros and cons taken into consideration, an early establishment of direct transportation links is not only a symbol of success in Beijing's Taiwan policy over the past decade -- which is in turn conducive to its economic and trade development -- but also advantageous to its grand strategy in which pushing for unification outweighs opposing independence.
In cross-strait relations, oppos-ing independence alone does not necessarily result in unification because Taiwan can maintain the status quo. On the other hand, if China can push for unification, "independence" will naturally disappear and its anti-independence goal can be achieved without extra effort.
Moreover, in the eyes of Bei-jing's leaders, the rule of the DPP -- a party they deemed a stronghold of pro-independence forces -- has proven to be nothing special so far. This sense of security can explain why China has been somewhat restrained in its propaganda attacks and military threats in the past two years.
Since Taiwan independence is not a pressing issue, the pressure now put to contain independence elements is already enough. If more pressure is added, military action might become unavoidable. Given the international environment and Sino-US relations, the side effects of military action might be too great and could grant the US an excuse to interfere in Taiwan Strait affairs, as evidenced in the 1995 to 1996 missile crisis.
Pushing for unification has therefore become the primary goal. But as to how to promote unification, strengthen interaction and interdependence between Taiwan and China and finally make interdependence and integration the guiding principles, Beijing believes that direct transportation links are absolutely conducive to these goals.
Then what may direct links bring to Beijing's opponent? Compared with the benefits China can garner, is the establishment of such links in Taipei's interests? Beijing certainly has evaluated the outcomes. It is generally believed that direct links might be beneficial to President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), but this is not a sure thing.
Given the fact that Taiwan's electoral situations keep changing, opening up the links during Chen's tenure does not necessarily assure him a second term. Meanwhile, since Taiwan's sluggish economy is a result of structural problems, a bit of rational thinking enables one to clearly understand that direct links are no panacea. Direct links may only turn out to be a flash in the pan and the DPP will have to step down if the economy does not take an upturn at that time.
Even if Chen wins a second term, Beijing holds that he will not move beyond the current framework toward real independence as defined by Beijing. By contrast, China can benefit from pushing for unification, so this is not a difficult policy choice for it.
Another factor influencing links is whether Taiwan's government will interfere in negotiations and the positioning of transportation routes. On Beijing's part, it is certainly the best if the links can be made domestic in nature, with the government excluded and negotiations conducted through non-government entities. If not, it does not lose anything.
Allowing Taiwan's government to step into negotiations seems to foil Beijing's consistent strategy of depriving Taiwan of sovereignty and localizing it. But from another point of view, direct official contacts actually enable China's political clout, via negotiations, to penetrate Taiwan's government. In the long term, this constitutes a good opportunity for Beijing to control Taiwan's political circles.
As for the status of the direct links, everyone is clear that the positioning of transportation routes can by no means deviate from the norms of international routes. It will be even harder to resist pressure from other nations to get a slice of the pie. Making enemies for this reason appears to be unwise for Beijing.
Moreover, if the transport routes really turn into international routes, the globalization trend will only make the links more lucrative, facilitating China's costal development and boosting inter-actions between Taiwan and China. Such a change will further speed up economic and social integration between the two sides. What harm will it do to unifica-tion? As long as the links are not directly named "international routes," Beijing will face not a single obstacle.
Even if Taiwan's government intervenes in negotiations, this will not affect Beijing's status as the sole legitimate government of China nor will it call into question China's unification stance.
Of course, trade and postal links have become a reality and few would deny that this is an irresistible trend. No doubt, Taiwan can gain some benefits. But in any case, Beijing can only profit from this business and will not lose anything.
Taiwan should avoid further aggravating conflicts between political parties over this issue, dispel unnecessary misgivings and carefully consider the possible challenges and impacts. This urgent mission cannot be delayed.
Chang Kuo-cheng is former deputy director of the DPP's Chinese Affairs Department.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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