In any country, there is generally a right-wing faction and a left-wing faction. In most cases, the right is conservative and the left is in favor of reform. From this perspective, Taiwan's advocates of unification should be considered the right and advocates of independence the left.
Recently, however, in the course of discussions with Taiwan-ese friends, I have discovered that it is impossible to break down the situation in such simple terms. Dividing Taiwan's political spectrum into right and left, I fear, only confuses matters.
Why can't Taiwan achieve a breakthrough in its relations with Japan? No doubt the people of Taiwan have great difficulty understanding this problem. It relates to being unable to distinguish clearly between the right and the left.
Ever since the hardline anti-communist era of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), the Japanese politicians Taiwan has relied upon or considered friends have all been right-wing figures and the majority of those in Japan's right-wing faction are colored by nationalism.
Leaving aside the question of whether nationalism is good or bad, Japanese nationalism is unpopular both at home and abroad. It was used to send citizens onto the battlefields of World War II and, after Japan's defeat, it was never scrutinized as the driving force that led to the war. Instead, discussion became virtually taboo. Japanese are particularly averse to the word "patriotism."
But, on the other hand, hardline right-wing nationalists who are unhappy with this situation advocate the revival of militarism and nationalism.
The historical background of Taiwanese nationalism, however, is completely different.
Taiwanese nationalism under the name of the "localization" movement was used to bolster Taiwan's democratization, which began when Lee Teng-hui (
Differences between Taiwanese and Chinese (including a portion of the mainlanders in Taiwan) were emphasized and opposition to China was strengthened in order to sweep its influence out of Taiwanese politics.
At the same time, Japanese nationalism has always been inherently anti-communist and opposing China is one of its guiding principles. So Taiwanese nationalists in the Lee Teng-hui era were well-disposed to the nationalists of the Japanese right because of their common opposition to China. In other words, the affinity was based on the theory that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara (石原慎太郎) and the comic book artist Yoshinori Kobayashi (小林善紀) are typical of Japanese politicians who became popular in Taiwan.
Even after the transfer of power in Taiwan, the government has continued to follow the foreign policy of the previous administration. This is one of the reasons why it has been unable to achieve a breakthrough in relations with Japan. Mainstream opinion in Japan is wary of nationalism and equally wary of those who are close to right-wing Japanese nationalists. This has obstructed the advancement of relations with Japan.
Taiwan's democratization is not entirely a matter of nationalism, however. There is another element to it -- that of left-wing reform. Democratization repre-sents demand for sweeping reform in Taiwan. If a different approach could be taken and contact made with Japan's reform faction, then, by giving the impression that Taiwan is undergoing reforms, it could perhaps make a breakthrough in future relations with Japan.
Takefumi Hayata is publisher of the Taiwan Report Weekly.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath