The fact that China has initiated a new series of semantic campaigns to downgrade Taiwan's political stance deserves special attention in Taipei.
In mid-October, just before Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) embarked on his US trip, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) told a Taipei newspaper that direct cross-strait air and shipping links could be simply called "cross-strait" links, rather than "domestic" links.
Pressured by the pro-unification camp and domestic and foreign business communities, the Chen Shui-bian (
Qian's new statement displays nothing but a strategy under which businesses are used to pressurize Chen. A revaluation of the Chinese negotiation behavior reveals Qian's move was just old wine in a new bottle.
The Chinese are masters of the symbolic act. Soon after Qian released his unofficial stance toward Taipei, Jiang reiterated the precondition for direct links, that is, Taiwan must embrace the "one China" principle and the formula of "one country, two systems." While asking Taipei to speed up the pace for opening the three links, Jiang insisted that Taiwan yield to Chinese sovereignty.
Second, by allying with the pro-unification force in Taiwan and by making best use of Taiwan's declined economy, Beijing could easily divide and conquer. Beijing has been taking advantage of the lack of domestic consensus in Taiwan regarding cross-strait policy. This explains why Beijing has made tremendous efforts to court opposition legislators, pro-unification media and businessmen from Taiwan as a way to generate pressure on the Chen administration's mainland policy.
Third, the Chinese negotiators also resort to the argument that "business should be separated from politics," hoping to draw more international support for three direct links. By doing so, Beijing could portray the Chen administration as the troublemaker who abused economic leverage and sacrificed regional prosperity for political reasons.
Fourth, when PRC negotiators wish to convey the impression -- often not very convincingly -- that they do not particularly care about a given situation or about attaining a certain objective. This is demonstrated by Beijing's use of economic liberalization to cover up its own military ambition.
Finally, it is generally acknowledged that Beijing often sets up a deadline to pressure opponents into making concessions. Beijing's downplaying of Chen's goodwill and stressing the deadline for the acceptance of the "one China" principle shows Beijing's hopes to control the negotiation.
In the case of opening three links, Beijing skillfully invited Taiwan's oppositions to dance to its tune. KMT lawmaker John Chang (
It seems China's new round of playing the economic card has generated tremendous pressure on the Chen administration. It may take a certain period of time for both sides to actually engage in meaningful talks. However, Taiwanese leaders should understand a lot about the nature of the Chinese negotiator before actually dealing with them.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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