President Chen Shui-bian (
Legislators from the pan-blue camp want to amend the Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (
But the big question remains of who will lead such negotiations. There have been a variety of suggestions, but the commercial negotiation mechanism used for cross-strait negotiations under the WTO agreement seems to be the best approach. Using this mechanism would elevate the links issue to the level of international commercial relations. It would also comply with the government's view of the Chinese market as a key part in Taiwan's internationalization efforts.
The SEF and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait have conducted negotiations in the past. No new negotiation channels would have to be established if they were used -- as would be the case if private companies or associations negotiated directly with their counterparts. The transportation question involves many issues that require authorization and certification from public institutions and this would cause lengthy delays in the negotiations. Remember how drawn out the Taiwan-Hong Kong aviation pact negotiations were?
In fact, to talk about opening direct links is a bit of a misnomer, since both postal and business links have basically been open for a while. Transportation links remain the sole sticking point.
Although China said that it now views direct links from a cross-strait perspective instead of a domestic one, it still wants to restrict participation to transport companies from the two sides of the Strait and bar international companies. This is tantamount to viewing the Strait as a domestic waterway and navigation rights as domestic in nature.
The international community should make sure its voice is heard. The Strait is an international waterway and restricting access to it, even if just for traffic between China and Taiwan, is not acceptable. Taiwan has long been a busy international transfer center. Even if Taipei and Beijing were to privately reach such an agreement, the international business community would be unlikely to accept it.
The opening of direct transport links would be a significant milestone in cross-strait reconciliation efforts. But that doesn't mean the connection will be an easy one to implement or maintain. Many in Taiwan question the sincerity of Chinese officials, feeling that the "honey-mouthed and dagger-hearted" Beijing government is simply launching another propaganda campaign. After all, at the annual Beidaihe conference in September, Chinese leaders said that using business to pursue unification is more effective than politics or missiles.
If China wishes to push reconciliation forward, it could start by changing its attitude and its approach. Removing the hundreds of missiles deployed along its coastline targeted at Taiwan would go a long way toward erasing the doubts and fears people here have about Beijing.
After all, in view of the cross-strait arms race, opening direct links so that aircraft and missiles could fly together and cargoships and warships sail side-by-side is contradictory and incomprehensible .
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