Politically, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's time is running out, and the alleged corrupt practices of his sons have accelerated the erosion of his authority tremendously. The recent thaw in inner-Korean relations may well be Kim's last chance to improve his tarnished image. No doubt, the president has always been concerned about his political legacy. It is an exceptional irony, that the very institution created to preserve his political inheritance -- the foundation bearing his name -- has become the core of alleged corruption.
While Kim has arguably done more to promote democracy and the market economy in South Korea than all his predecessors together, his place in history will probably not be that of a domestic reformer. Outshining his accomplishments at home are his visionary moves toward North Korea. For many South Koreans, who have given up hope that the "Sunshine Policy" may bear fruits, this may sound unacceptable. Still, I believe history will show there is no other rational method of overcoming hostility and achieving national reunification than the path devised by the beleaguered
president.
ILLUSTRATION: YUSHA
According to the joint statement issued at Mount Kumgang last Sunday, ministers from both sides will convene in Seoul next week to discuss a list of bilateral issues, most of which have already been agreed upon in principle in earlier negotiations and are only waiting to be implemented. Does this herald a new chapter in inter-Korean relations? Considering the history of such relations, I abstain from such optimistic assumptions at this stage.
Reading the statement issued after the recent meeting, I was reminded of similar inter-Korean announcements, that have one point in common: none of them was ever filled with life. In this sense, one may call inter-Korean relations a history of broken promises, or -- in most cases -- a history of broken North Korean promises.
Most analysts agree that what is often referred to as the erratic behavior of the leadership in Pyongyang is the main culprit for this unfortunate state of affairs. For the communist leaders, unpredictability has become an essential strategic weapon in dealing with the outside world. The lack of predictability is far from irrational; it is rational as long as it serves the main -- and overriding -- objective of the North Korean regime. This is the political survival of the present rulers.
This maxim of North Korean international relations must be considered for understanding Pyongyang's foreign policy. The regime rejects any international engagements that may -- directly or indirectly -- endanger its stability. This, too, may explain the difficulties of the present US administration of coming to terms with the North Koreans, who remain highly suspicious of the ulterior aims of the US.
For sure, the Americans of the George W. Bush administration have not given Pyongyang any assurances that they respect the regime and are not out to undermine it. Until this very day, no clear picture has emerged as to where Washington is aiming at vis-a-vis the communist regime. More than one and a half years after its inception, the Bush administration is reportedly still bickering about a common strategy to confront Pyongyang. On the one side we find the diplomats, supporting non-confrontational tactics, on the other side stand the hawks, who -- regarding America's dealings with the "rogue states" -- prefer the iron fist of military power.
For the moment, the diplomats and their champion Secretary of State Colin Powell seem to have gained the upper hand regarding North Korea-policy. Powell's recent encounter with North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun is the first official contact between the two countries since Bush's provocative "axis of evil" speech early this year.
The prospects of a reduction of tensions in US-North Korean relations are good news for inter-Korean affairs. As recent history of North-South relations teaches, there is little chance for sustained improvement as long as tensions prevail in relations between Washington and Pyongyang.
Politically, this puts the US in the driver's seat of inter-Korean developments. In a way, the Koreans on both sides of the divide have become political hostages of the Americans. Concretely, this implies that the prospects for the future of the inter-Korean ministerial talks to begin early next week are very much also a variable of what happens in regard to the rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang. Will July 31's tete-a-tete of the two foreign ministers in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei be more than a short lived exercise in diplomacy? Only in this case will inter-Korean relations have a true chance for substantial progress.
Apart from the renewed US-
initiative there are other factors that make me guardedly optimistic this time: I am not thinking of the economic arguments mentioned in this context by many an observers as driving forces behind Pyong-yang's opening to the Western world. No, I am thinking of the political developments in South Korea.
One of the main political variables in the strategic puzzle in and around the Korean peninsula is the upcoming presidential elections in the South. As is well known, Kim Dae-jung's days in power are numbered. The rulers in the North, too, will have noted that the main conservative contender and front-runner in the struggle for control of the Blue House has left no doubt he will move away from the "Sunshine-Policy" and follow a North Korea policy guided by the principle of reciprocity. If Lee Hoi-chang means what he says and wins the elections, Seoul's position toward the North may well toughen in the coming year.
Considering that the Kim administration will be in power until next February, it is surely not too late for a dramatic breakthrough in inter-Korean affairs. A dramatic step forward it would be should North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il make true his promise and travel to Seoul for his reciprocal visit. He could be sure that Kim Dae-jung -- and with him many peace-loving South Koreans -- would give him a warm reception.
Ronald Meinardus is the resident representative of the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in the Philippines and a commentator on Asian affairs.
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