The Pentagon recently published its annual report on Chinese military power, detailing the imbalance in power between Taiwan and China. In the report, Washington questions China's sincerity about bringing the cross-strait stalemate to a peaceful resolution, and suggests that China has shifted its military strategy from "invading Taiwan" to "forcing Taiwan to surrender with the use of superior weapons." The report also indicates that the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) makes it unclear whether cross-strait stability is still the top priority for Chinese leaders or not. The reality is that the Chinese leadership is not completely consumed with the idea of invading Taiwan. Rather, its primary concern is how to force Taiwan to capitulate through simply expanding the power of the PLA.
While the report offers an objective perspective, we cannot afford to ignore several crucial facts that have emerged over time. First of all, the current US administration is keeping an eye on China.
Unlike former US president Bill Clinton, George W. Bush regards China as a strategic competitor. Last year, following the collision of a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet, a 14-strong US air crew was detained on Hainan Island. Bush played his cards aggressively, demanding the crew be returned as soon as possible. In addition, he has on more than one occasion publicly displayed his willingness to help Taiwan to defend herself. Last year, despite China's strong protest, the US Congress agreed to a robust weapons package for Taiwan, which substantially upgraded Taiwan's defense capability.
The report comes at a critical juncture when Chinese armed forces are growing exponentially. Indeed, it conceivably has been calculated to warn China against breaking the regional balance of power.
After imperialist Japan's defeat in World War II, there have been few outbreaks of war in the Asia-Pacific region. But peace may not last long as China continues to boost its military might. With Chinese leaders modernizing and enlarging the PLA over the past decade, there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that China is gradually preparing to become the dominant regional power. China has the world's second-largest national defense budget, second only to the US.
Corroborated sources also say that the PLA has at least 300 medium-range ballistic missiles deployed on China's southeast coast, aimed at major Taiwanese cities and landmarks, and the number of missiles increases every year.
Without a strong defensive capacity, Taiwan will be vulnerable to missile attacks. Speculation is, however, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan is not likely in the near future. After winning its bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, China is carrying out a thorough image makeover and is eager to improve its image in the international community. As a result, China's leaders cannot afford to go to war right now. In addition, Chinese leadership is about to change, with Jiang Zemin (
The vast majority of Taiwanese people favor maintenance of the status quo: maintaining an ambiguous political relationship with the Chinese government while continuing to do business with China.
There are estimated to be 300,000 Taiwanese businessmen in Shanghai alone. More and more local enterprises are moving to China for its cheap labor and vast market. Longing to boost Taiwan's economy, Taiwan's government is relaxing regulations on trade and commercial activity with China and considering establishing direct links. China and Taiwan seem to be building inextricable economic links to one another. Apart from close economic ties, China and Taiwan are also bound by ethnic ties.
As China steps up modernization of its armed forces, it may well have more strategic plans. The approximately 2-million-strong PLA vastly outnumbers the Taiwanese military, which has only 400,000 men under arms. But the PLA may find itself being kept back by its rear, as its navy does not yet have the capacity to cross the Taiwan Strait. With its sophisticated warships and advanced radar system, the Taiwanese navy is renowned for its defensive and pre-emptive capacities. Moreover, logistics could also pose a sticky problem for China, which still lacks vessels capable of transporting the PLA and its amphibious forces across the strait. As for air control, Taiwan's air force is apparently superior to China in terms of the quality of its pilots and aircraft.
The problem concerning the Taiwan military, though, is that it lacks experience in integrated, multi-level operations. The navy, air force and army have rarely performed joint military exercises.
Clearly, modernization of China's armed force has the broader aim of developing China into a regional power and bringing Taiwan to heel. We cannot turn a blind eye to this development.
At this critical point in history, the leaders of both sides should keep in mind that it is the well-being of the people that counts, and they should seek the best solution in accordance with that principle.
Chang Yan-ting is a colonel in the ROC Air Force and an associate professor at the Department of International Studies at the Political Warfare College.
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