This June the Chinese military conducted its first test-firing of a new Russian-made air-to-air missile, setting off alarm bells throughout Asia. The AA-12 Adder missile boasts the ability to shoot down multiple enemy aircraft "beyond visual range" -- that is, before they even come into sight of the pilot. And its guidance system permits the pilot to "fire and forget," meaning that the missile finds its way to the target without human intervention.
The Adder will substantially increase China's combat air power, eroding the long-standing qualitative edge enjoyed by the Taiwanese air force, which has no beyond-visual-range capability. In short, it could allow China to wrest away control of the airspace over the country and the Taiwan Strait -- and encourage Beijing to try to settle the Taiwan question by force.
In response, the Bush administration has been considering whether to release the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), a US missile sporting similar capabilities, to Taiwan, to right the impending imbalance.
Why the fuss over the AMRAAM transfer? In the 1990s, because of its traditional reluctance to introduce potentially destabilizing technologies to Asia, Washington hammered out an awkward arrangement under which the missiles are stored in the US, to be delivered to Taiwan if China deploys advanced missiles first or a conflict breaks out.
Moreover, the administration's review of an AIM-120 transfer has -- surprise, surprise -- provoked the Chinese government to cry foul, claiming that any such transfer constitutes meddling in China's internal affairs. But the White House should recognize it will never please Beijing as far as the Taiwan issue is concerned.
Beijing has been buying advanced fighter jets, destroyers, and submarines from Russia to the tune of billions of dollars. Of course it will decry efforts to help Taipei. Indeed, the proposed sale of the ultra high-tech AEGIS destroyers to Taiwan last year elicited similarly shrill responses from Beijing.
Some naysayers in the US government assert that Chinese testing does not constitute an ability to use the Adder. Hogwash. In a bipartisan Senate letter urging the State Department to reverse the export policy, the senators state, "It is clear that absent US transfer to Taiwan of the AIM-120 missiles, the introduction of the AA-12 into China's arsenal represents a major shift in airpower. ... This means that we cannot afford to quibble over whether the AA-12 tests mean that China has an operational capability."
Well said.
Operationally, the best way to look at a transfer of the AIM-120 to Taiwan is this: both the Chinese and Taiwanese air forces want to control the same airspace -- the airspace over the Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's wants to upgrade its fighters with beyond-visual-range missiles to achieve one overriding goal in a war with Taipei: to dominate the skies so that air strikes against key Taiwanese military and civilian targets can commence.
Obviously, this objective cannot be interpreted as anything other than offensive in nature. The missiles are clearly designed to skew the balance of power in favor of China, in keeping with China's declared military strategy to coerce Taiwan into submission.
For Taiwan, on the other hand, outfitting its fighters with a new generation of air-to-air missiles will restore parity in the contest for air superiority -- and help maintain the technological edge that the island's air force has long enjoyed. As the defender in any conceivable conflict, Taipei's limited goal is to protect its own airspace and that over the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing cannot credibly paint the proposed AIM-120 transfer as a threat to its security. Taipei surely knows that taking the fight to China would provoke a devastating response; and Taiwan's leaders are not suicidal.
Consequently, the acquisition of gee-whiz air-to-air defensive missiles will not delude Taiwanese statesmen into believing they could prevail in an offensive against China. Rather, the AIM-120 will allow them to resist China's attempt to settle the long-standing cross-strait feud by force -- and enhance, in the bargain, prospects for a diplomatic settlement.
What should the US do? Simple: it should immediately transfer the agreed number of missiles to Taiwan, if necessary from existing US Air Force stockpiles. Washington does not have to worry about shedding some supplies that might be needed for other potential conflicts, such as the military campaign against Iraq currently under consideration.
Even if a war against Baghdad takes place before new missiles can be built for US fighters, it won't matter much: the Iraqi air force was decimated or fled the country over a decade ago, taking with it Baghdad's ability to contest US air supremacy.
Having the AIM-120s in its possession will allow Taiwan to mount a serious defense against the Chinese air force. The rapid pace of a war in the Taiwan Strait, combined with sheer geographic distance, could keep Washington from rushing the missiles to Taiwan in time if a crisis broke out. And Taiwanese pilots need to train in the actual battle-space, rather than at bases in the US; otherwise they would be at a serious disadvantage in an air conflict.
To bolster Taipei's ability to resist aggression, and thus fortify its negotiating posture, the US needs to ship the AIM-120s to Taiwan. Now.
Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes are Ph.D. candidates at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and research fellows at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing