There was comparatively little news coverage of the Hu Jintao (
The international news agencies predictably did more speculation on how this would improve US-PRC relations, or on the extent of reforms Hu was likely to pursue. Newspaper accounts were more neutral in their descriptions of both expectations and results. During the visit, The Washington Post had a balanced article on how the US was favoring Taiwan, and the New York Times had an article about how the Chinese Communist Party is debating party reforms. Other articles largely reiterated that the visit went largely as expected.
Much of this effort to keep the visit low key seems to have come from the Hu camp, anxious to avoid political problems back home. Among other things, no press conferences were held. The administration of US President George W. Bush did arrange for Hu to meet with Cabinet officers, the vice president, and the president, but largely refrained from appearing to be engaged in substantive discussions.
On the subject of Taiwan, China in the past would have used the visit to routinely routinely press for a reaffirmation of the "three no's" or for a 4th communique or some joint statement. Now, however, they seemed relieved that Bush at least referred to the three communiques, though he always mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as well when he did so.
Stating the continuance of the US' "one-China" policy seemed to have become a pro forma side issue. With the PRC-Taiwan economic relationship moving in China's favor, Hu followed Beijing's focus on the military relationship between the US and Taiwan. According to reports, the US continued to counter his complaints by bringing up China's missiles that are pointing at Taiwan.
The US-Taiwan relationship is unquestionably much stronger than it has ever been, at least since 1979. This has visibly given Taiwan greater confidence in pursuing its international objectives. In one sense, even for the US, this is a positive development. It does send the message to allies in the Pacific that we are adhering to our security commitments. Additionally, the US has always held that a confident Taiwan makes cross-strait dialogue more likely. On the other hand, it also places a responsibility on Taiwan, not only for its relationship with the US, but with the whole region, in balancing that confidence with prudence.
The rationale the US states for strengthening the Taiwan relationship is to readjust the relations the US has with both China and Taiwan in general, and in particular to meet US obligations under the TRA in light of China's missile buildup. There has also been a long-delayed need to adjust the manner in which the US conducts its relationship with Taiwan in light of Taiwan's democratization.
But fundamental policies have not changed. US security interests in the Pacific and East Asia remain the same. The importance of US economic interests in East Asia are as vital as ever and the importance of managing US relations with China will, if anything, become greater. Many of the problems with these policies, such as the differences in the US between the Executive Branch and Congress on China policy, or the ambiguities that have permitted flexibility but bedeviled understanding, remain.
Likewise, the US will continue to sidestep the sovereignty issue, refuse to mediate, and insist that a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue be made by the two sides themselves. The phrase that usually accompanied these statements was that neither side should unilaterally resolve the issue, but lately has become that the two sides should reopen dialogue, and that neither side should be provocative.
Under such circumstances, where is the line between Taiwan confidently pursuing efforts to improve its position, and provocation as seen from the Chinese or US side? The answer is not clear.
In fact, the increasing use of the word "provocation" adds another ambiguous word to the cross-strait vocabulary. At the moment, there is not a very clear interpretation of what constitutes "provocation." It perhaps includes the missiles pointed at Taiwan, but the missiles provide a US justification for strengthening Taiwan's defense as called for in the TRA. Blocking the participation of Taiwan in international organizations could fall in the provocation category. Verbal assaults against Taiwan by the Beijing leadership, however, do not seem to qualify.
On the Taiwan side, provocation seems to mean even verbal statements that Beijing does not like to hear. That seems simple enough to manage, but overlooks the domestic problem this causes. In the give-and-take of an open and highly competitive political system, verbally-stated positions on any subject could become an important political issue. This is especially true when so emotional and fundamental an issue as national identity is debated. Whatever side of that debate a political leader is on, being even a little bit provocative on that subject can win or lose votes. In other words, a ruling party under such circumstances would be hamstrung on the issue, while the opposition would be afforded an open field to attack it.
So having the US demonstrate strong support for Taiwan to some degree does justify greater confidence in dealing with the cross-strait issue. But it does not replace domestic strength and support. The uncertainties about security may be reduced by US commitment, but only solid domestic support can assure a strong position at the bargaining table.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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