Winston Churchill once said that Americans and Britons were two peoples separated by a common language. The phrase could be even more aptly applied to the Chinese and Taiwanese. A week of visits to Taiwan and the PRC leaves me once again marvelling at how poorly two peoples who share a common language and heritage understand or communicate with one another.
One case in point: a common complaint in China is that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and other senior DPP leaders deny their "Chineseness." This is only partially true.
Chen refuses to state that he is Chinese, for fear that this would be interpreted as "Chinese citizen," which would then be interpreted as "PRC citizen," which would then be interpreted as accepting Beijing's authority, something no Taiwanese leader, regardless of political affiliation, could do.
But Chen has announced that he would like to visit the home of his ancestors in China, which sounds pretty much like an admission of his Chineseness to me. Instead of praising this comment and perhaps even extending an invitation, Beijing rejects the visit request as a trick or as "insincere" and interprets Chen's cautiousness on this issue as further proof that the DPP is pursuing a policy of "creeping independence."
Meanwhile, Taipei sees China's continued insistence on acceptance of a "one China" policy, regardless of definition, as "creeping jurisdiction." The casualty in all this is what is really needed: namely, creeping reconciliation. If Beijing were interested in the latter, it would challenge Chen to take "yes" for an answer by stating that it welcomes any and all Taiwan residents to visit their ancestral homes to celebrate their common heritage.
Chen could be invited "in his private capacity" -- a formulation that has allowed for interaction in the past -- or even as the head of the DPP. Some would argue that this may be too dramatic a step for Beijing to take, especially during a period of leadership transition. But the reverse argument could also be made. What better way for Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) to solidify his place in history than to host Chen in his ancestral home -- this is the stuff of which Nobel Peace Prizes are made.
Another opportunity for creeping reconciliation centers on Taiwan's efforts to participate in WHO activities. Taipei's latest effort to gain observer status in the WHO's upcoming World Health Assembly seems doomed to failure, because of Chinese pressure to keep Taiwan out. But why? China has been firm in expressing its "three no's" policy: no independence; no "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan;" and no Taiwan membership in international organizations requiring statehood for membership. But Taiwan is not seeking membership in the WHO as a sovereign state.
Instead it is seeking observer status as a "health entity," a formulation that expressly takes China's demands into account (demonstrating a certain amount of insight and political courage on Taipei's part).
Instead of blocking Taiwan's participation (as it is almost certain once again to do), Beijing should nominate Chinese Taipei (the terminology used in other international forums) for observer status as a health entity, as an expression of its deep and genuine concern for the health and well-being of the Chinese people on Taiwan. Such a step would not only be consistent with China's stated position regarding Taiwanese participation in international organizations, but would actually reinforce it, while also creating a bit of goodwill in Taiwan toward China, something which is conspicuously absent today.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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