Turkey or Iran? The societies of those two countries form the socio-political models currently on offer in the Middle East, and not only to the Muslim Middle East. From Syria to Kyrgyzstan they confront each other, not as open enemies, but as rivals for influence in determining the shape and conduct of countries in the region.
Across the Arab world the death of the great 20th-century ideologies left behind disillusion. No Arab ruler can claim a following outside his country of the sort that Gamel Nasser, the Egyptian president who was also the acknowledged leader of pan-Arab aspirations, once did. The cult of Saddam Hussein forms only a approximation. Only Turkey and Iran possess an ideology, a diagnosis of what ails the Muslim world, and a prescription for its cure.
Turkey emphasizes modernization. One Turkish ideologue put the case with brutal frankness: "It is nonsense to talk about this civilization and that civilization. At the present time, there is only one civilization in the world that is living and advancing, all the others are dead or dying. We must join that one civilization, or be uncivilized."
But that's an extreme formulation. Most Turks are less radical. Yet it makes clear the basic philosophy of Kemalism (the ruling ideas of Kemal Ataturk) which says that to survive and prosper a country must become part of modern civilization, accepting much of what is distinctively Western, including equal rights for women, teaching modern science, and disestablishing religion so that it no longer plays a part in government or the legal process.
Islamic Iran is the polar opposite. Its ideology, basically, goes: "All our troubles arise from the fact that we abandoned our religion, abandoned our culture; we have aped the ways of the infidel; the only way to achieve what we hope and want in life is to return to authentic Islam."
Both ideas have immense appeal. Not only in the countries concerned, but most importantly in the Muslim states that emerged after the Soviet Union's collapse. Those countries are now a focus of this rivalry. Iran's government maintains a series of special agencies to promote the Islamic revolution by word and deed. They operate in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. The Turks disavow any desire to play a missionary role. They don't try to bring Kemalism to others, but they do set an example, which others admire and imitate.
In the rest of the Islamic world, the choices posed by Iran and Turkey confront each other dramatically, as in Algeria. In Egypt, there is a powerful militant religious opposition. In Afghanistan and Sudan, militants are in control.
The economic situation in the Arab world shapes the ways in which these models compete. The Arab world depends on oil and gas exports. Sooner or later these will end, either because oil is superseded by other energy sources or because supplies become exhausted. According to World Bank figures, total exports, other than oil and gas, of the whole Arab world amount to less than those of Finland. Add the region's growing population to the mix and you have a recipe for catastrophe.
Lacking oil, the Turks were obliged to develop their economy without resorting to exports of natural resources, and have done pretty well until recently. Iran, however, depends on oil. The differences in the economies of the two countries plays a role in shaping the rivalry between them, though it does not seem to determine what happens. Resource-poor Afghanistan became an Islamic state; under the rule of Nursultan Nazerbayev, oil rich Kazakstan is following the authoritarian-would-be-democratic line Ataturk pursued in his lifetime.
Obviously many in the region find this situation incomprehensible. They still try to involve outside powers in their affairs because -- after 200 years of colonial and ideological occupation -- they have lost the habit of deciding for themselves. Everyone, that is, save the Turks and Iranians, who never lost their independence.
The window of opportunity for these two social models to compete with each other, however, is likely to be brief given the hideous events that have occurred in New York and Washington, and America's likely retaliation against terrorists and their sponsors.
Moreover, sooner or later, a new power will rise in Russia. It may be fascist; it may be, but is unlikely to be, communist; it may be tsarist; it may be pan-orthodox; it may even be democratic. But sooner or later, a newly reinvigorated Russia will emerge and it will obviously be interested in a region close to its southern frontier, wherever that southern frontier may be -- something which is not very clear at the moment.
China, too, will grow in influence. Most of China's western provinces are populated with Turkish-speaking Muslims, who are deeply affected by what happens beyond the frontier. As a Muslim power, China is becoming increasingly involved in Central Asia as the recent Shanghai summit among the leaders of China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgizstan demonstrated. From Central Asia, Chinese influence may move westward. A nuclear-armed India is another country with potential for a Middle East role.
If governments and peoples in the Middle East remain as they are, it is virtually certain that the "Great Game," as it used to be called, will be renewed, but with different players. As the battle against terrorism takes shape, it will become a question as to whether or not Turkey and Iran remain players, or become pawns, of the new "Great Power" rivals.
Bernard Lewis is professor of Middle East History at Princeton University.
Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath