The people of Taiwan have astonishing sensitivity and perspicacity about numbers. When a stock index rises or falls by a few dozen points, the media can instantly offer elaborate explanations (though I don't understand why they don't warn the public about the likely rise or fall beforehand). When unemployment rises by 2 percentage points, TV commentators can tell the audience where the problem is just a few hours after the figure is released (so why do economists have to spend half a year writing articles?). And the industrial exodus? Every-one knows that the "no haste, be patient" (戒急用忍) policy is at fault. But all this is by no means surprising. TV stations always open bottles of champagne for a celebration when audience ratings are up by 1 percent. When illegal lotteries were all the rage several years ago, some people could supposedly read the winning numbers from the shapes of twigs.
The hottest topic over the past two months has been the "one country, two systems" model. Several former high-ranking government officials have said, "The proportion of Taiwanese people supporting the model is rising dramatically." Even the chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has said, "(The percentage of) those in favor of the model was only in single digits in the past. The figure has grown at an amazing speed since May 20 last year."
And we need not even mention the excitement felt by the government across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Zhang Mingqing (張銘清) pointed out, "The results of public opinion polls conducted by the council show that the people of Taiwan supporting the model has risen from 3 percent to 15 percent, which very well explains the Taiwan people's expectations with regard to unification." One legislator chimed in by saying, "Supporters of the model have increased five-fold."
Meanwhile, the media and scholars dutifully seek explanations. Some say China's economic advances have led to a shift in the Taiwan public's sense of national identity; some think people have lost their confidence in Taiwan's future under the status quo; others even attribute it to China's successful implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong (although these people may like to visit the Web site of the Chinese University of Hong Kong at http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ipro/000509(2).htm and have a look at its public opinion polls).
The MAC's polls that Zhang quoted are indeed one of the sources giving an impression that more and more people support one country, two systems. The best way to get a clear picture is therefore to review the polls. From the MAC's polls (http://www.mac.gov.tw/mlpolicy/pos/900325/9003_8.gif), we can establish the following.
First, the polls were conducted by different institutions between January 1991 and March 2001. Some polls conducted by non-academic institutions show substantially higher rates for supporters of the model. These differences may reflect differences in the designs of the questionnaires.
Second, support for one country, two systems support has risen and fallen between January 1991 and April 2000, even if we include the polls by non-academic institutions. It is impossible to draw an upward curve by using any statistical models. The average for these figures is 7.4 percent, the median 8.1 percent, and the standard deviation 2.2 percent.
Third, the two polls conducted after President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took office give proportions of people in favor of one country, two systems as 12.2 percent and 16.1 percent respectively. These figures may appear to be higher than the earlier ones, but the difference is not as wide as expected. By comparing them with the poll results released by other institutions, we can see that the margins of the rising percentages are quite similar. Support for one country, two systems is rising, but not "dramatically."
Fourth, and most interesting of all, the percentage of those against one country, two systems is not in any evident downturn (the two latest polls also show similar results). The average for these figures is 77.2 percent, and the median is 76.6 percent. In other words, the new supporters of the model most likely come from those who were previously indifferent.
The two figures that Zhang quoted happen to be the lowest and the highest numbers. We can also pick two figures that supported our position and say that "the number of those supporting the model are decreasing."
Taiwan's stock market investors focus on short-term profits instead of fundamentals. When it comes to politics, the people prefer emotions to substance. The "confederation" (邦聯) proposed by KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰), for example, is a very important proposal, but the media and aca-demia have scarcely discussed its contents. How many people can clearly explain one country, two systems? Even PRC President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) himself gave different interpretations in Beijing and Hong Kong. No wonder one well-known TV show host in Taiwan said, "I am for maintaining the status quo, so I support the one country, two systems' model."
The focuses on both short-term profits and on emotions are collective psychological states. Stocks will certainly fall when no one has confidence and everyone sells their shares at the same time. When people are talking about "investing in Shanghai" and one country, two systems, won't I fall behind the times if I don't follow them? If this goes on for long enough, short-term profits will completely replace fundamentals and emotions replace substance.
All this talk about rising support for one country, two systems reflects people's worries and frustration in the face of the economic slowdown. These emotions may really push the numbers up when they spread from one person to another. If those in favor of the model don't know what they are supporting, they may transfer their support to another scheme with similar attractiveness. When people refuse to use their brains, winning their hearts is indeed the best way to attract their support.
Lin Jih-wen is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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