The timing of Beijing's release of the US spy plane crew was very much in China's interest, given that the US government is to enter into arms sales talks with Taiwan late this month.
Beijing had three choices for the timing of the release: at the confirmation of the fate of Chinese fighter jet pilot Wang Wei (
On April 10, US President George W. Bush said that an early solution to the incident was in China's interest, and that the longer it dragged on, the more harm it would do to bilateral relations. On the morning of April 11, Bush announced that the two sides had reached an agreement, and that Beijing had agreed to release the crew.
In a letter sent to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (
Basically, the US does not believe it should take the blame for the collision, but it said sorry for the spy plane's emergency landing, which was in accordance with international emergency procedures, after the collision.
Bush had stood firm on not "apologizing" to China formally. According to a Gallup poll, 54 percent of US citizens do not think the US should apologize. But in a demonstration of the art of compromise, the letter said "very sorry" for two very specific matters other than the collision.
During the 10 days after the collision, the New York Times and the Washington Post ran at least five editorials supporting Bush's handling of the issue and criticizing Beijing's stance.
Members of Congress from the home constituencies of the crew members spoke out on the matter. The House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding immediate release of the crew, while some representatives revised their reservations about the sale of AEGIS-equipped destroyers to Taiwan.
Some Congress members canceled their scheduled trips to China. They also wanted to bring up the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act once again, and take tougher stances on China's entry into the WTO and on granting it Permanent Normal Trade Relations status. Some even called for the recall of the US ambassador to China. Secretary of State Colin Powell hinted that Bush's scheduled trip to China in October might be in question.
Beijing had the plane and its crew in its hands and demanded that the US stop flying reconnaissance flights along the Chinese coast. But as the days dragged on and the detained crew became hostages, the issue was no longer that the US-China "strategic partnership" had gone down the drain, but that the "strategic competitors" became strategic enemies.
Even though Jiang made it clear that the US was solely responsible for the incident, he released the crew before the Chinese pilot had been found, before the US had offered a formal apology, and before an investigation into the collision had begun. Beijing continues to hold the US spy plane, and the two sides are set to begin negotiations on April 18. Two major issues at the talks will be the US reconnaissance flights and how to avoid a repeat collision.
A solution has dawned on the standoff, but the two sides have learned quite a few lessons from it. US-China relations will no longer be as smooth as they were in the Clinton era. They will be a rather rocky mountain road.
Lin Cheng-yi is director of the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica.
Translated by Francis Huang
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