During a recent talk with top media honchos in the US, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (
Will China really fire the first shot in the near future if the Bush administration approves the sale of AEGIS-equipped vessels to Taiwan? Personally, I believe the possibility is low.
First, even if the US government agrees to sell AEGIS-equipped warships to Taiwan, the ships will not be delivered until 2008. Experts estimate that China will aim another 600 to 700 medium and short-range ballistic missiles at Taiwan by 2005, and the number may continue to go up through 2008. In other words, if Beijing is truly concerned about the threats to the offensive ability of its ballistic missiles posed by the AEGIS-equipped warships, it may well postpone the first strike against Taiwan until sufficiently more ballistic missiles have been properly placed at its coastal areas -- instead of launching a war right away.
Next, if Beijing decides to fire the first shot, a war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will break out. With its current military capability, China is not assured of a victory over Taiwan, not to mention the possibility that the Bush administration may send US troops to help Taipei.
Third, the Chinese government has just approved the outline for China's "10th Five-year Plan" (十五計劃). Evidently, for Beijing economic development remains at the top of the agenda for the next five years, and, therefore, China is not likely to launch a war against Taiwan simply over US arms sales to Taiwan. In fact, China will launch a war only if Taiwan declares independence.
It is noteworthy that, in Qian's words, he has said Beijing will be forced to solve the "Taiwan problem" by force. Qian's words, on one hand, try to threaten and force the Bush administration into not selling high-tech defensive weapons to Taiwan. But on the other hand, this also show the future direction of Beijing's Taiwan policy. In fact, during Qian's just-finished visit to the US, apart from his remarks in front of media, he kept a low profile about the cross-strait issue and stressed that Beijing is still in favor of "peaceful unification" (和平統一).
Meanwhile, Chinese academics and the media also suggest that Beijing should not break up the relationship with the US, showing that for the sake of economic development, China would not want to escalate tensions with the US. At the same time, neither does China want to see a war breaking out in the Taiwan Strait.
The reason that Qian linked US arms sales to Taiwan with a Chinese military strike against the country is that the AEGIS-equipped guided missile systems will reduce the offensive capability of China's ballistic missiles against Taiwan. On the other hand, Beijing also interprets the arms sales as a sign of additional interference by the US government in cross-strait affairs.
The concern is, given adequate defense capabilities and US backing, Taiwan will further lean toward independence, making the goal of unification increasingly remote. That is why Qian indicated in the US that China might give up the goal of "peaceful unification" and resort to military force instead.
Will Taiwan lean toward independence once it obtains the advanced AEGIS-equipped warships? These two issues, I believe, do not have any direct correlation. Besides, the US government may not be happy to see this happen.
The reality facing the Bush administration and the people of Taiwan, nevertheless, is that Beijing is now actively setting up more and more ballistic missiles aimed at the country. To safeguard Taiwan's security, the nation has no choice but to purchase better defensive weapons from the US.
In a word, if Beijing hopes that the US will stop providing high-tech defensive arms to Taiwan, Beijing must reduce its military threat to the country, including but not limited to refraining itself from making repeated objections over arms sales to Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the leaders of both sides should understand that the cross-strait issue must be resolved by political means, not military ones.
Wang Kao-cheng is an associate professor at the Department of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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