During a recent meeting with professors from Japan's Keio University, President Chen Shui-bian
These were not off-the-cuff remarks by any means. Taiwan's strategic importance in the region is declining because of China's political and economic success, the change in US strategies and Taiwan's own weakening economic competitive-ness. To spare Taiwan from strategic marginalization, we need to face up to these three factors. Taiwan's declining economic competitiveness is directly related to the improving political and economic conditions in China. The success of China's economic reforms is a fact and Taiwan must pragmatically face it instead of denying or evading it.
As the US, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries increase their participation in the China market, Taiwan should not bind its own hands and feet for political reasons. To do so would be detrimental to Taiwan's own political and economic development.
It is questionable how much the Bush administration will improve Taiwan's strategic predicament. Perhaps the administration's Asia-Pacific policy, which places more importance in its allies than in China -- and his correction of Bill Clinton's "strategic partner" definition of China -- signifies a move to rally naval powers against China.
Judging from the actual behavior of Bush's administration, however, I believe any change in US policy toward China and Taiwan will be limited.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell said during a congressional hearing that the US does not view China as an enemy and does not want to see it become an enemy.
The US will also abide by the "one China" policy when it comes to international organizations, reserving formal membership for China while only giving Taiwan "participation but not membership."
The US also continues to hum and haw about military sales to Taiwan and has not given any clear response to Taiwan's request for advanced weapons.
In its future Asia-Pacific diplomacy, Taiwan cannot simply depend on support from powerful countries like Japan and the US. Japan's strategic direction may change at any time. Also, it is currently inclined not to create any conflict with China.
Taiwan should utilize its own resources to build itself a favorable strategic position in East Asia. Given the trend toward peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan will not have the support of other countries in the event of a conflict with China.
Taiwan should set "peace, development and democracy" as the key notes for its Asia-Pacific strategy. In other words, it should readjust its China policy, recognize the "1992 consensus," resume cross-strait dialogue and stabilize cross-strait relations. Taiwan should strengthen cross-strait trade and economic exchanges and improve its own economic competitiveness and prowess.
Joining hands with other Asia-Pacific countries, Taiwan should encourage a "peaceful evolution" in China and promote China's democratization through exchanges. Only then can Taiwan be integrated into the political and economic network of the Asia-Pacific region and enjoy the increased political and economic benefits of such integration.
Wang Kao-cheng is an associate professor at the Research Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University.
Translated by Francis Huang
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