The prevailing assumption in both east Asia and the US is that the election of a Republican to the White House will mean the adoption of more pro-military policies. That is largely true. The US military tends to favor the GOP, and Republican politicians have generally provided generous funding levels for it.
Nevertheless, being pro-military does not necessarily mean giving the Pentagon everything that it wants. The military leadership has already discovered that there are limits to President George W. Bush's generosity.
By Yu Sha
Instead of immediately proposing large increases in the defense budget (as many conservatives in his party advocate), Bush insisted that a comprehensive review of US defense strategy and weapon systems be conducted first.
That review is likely to recommend that a number of weapon systems be scaled back or eliminated. Indeed, during the campaign Bush and several of his advisers hinted that it might be possible to skip an entire generation of weapons in some cases.
Equally significant (although it has received less attention) is that the administration is not necessarily wedded to keeping 100,000 US troops in east Asia. That represents a significant change from US policy during the Clinton years. In both the 1995 and 1998 editions of its Security Strategy Report for the east Asia-Pacific Region, the Department of Defense explicitly pledged to maintain that level of forces.
Bush administration officials have had numerous opportunities to reiterate that commitment but have declined to do so. Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage is on record as stating that there is nothing sacrosanct about the figure of 100,000 troops.
There are several reasons why the administration is likely to reduce the number of US military personnel stationed in east Asia. One factor is the mounting strain on the budget. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office and private research institutes conclude that the military budget will have to be increased by US$50 billion to US$100 billion a year to fund all existing and planned weapon systems and current personnel levels. There is almost no chance that even a Republican-controlled Congress will approve such a massive increase in spending. That means that there will have to be some cuts in both weapon systems and force levels.
An important reason why at least a portion of the cutback in forces is likely to occur in east Asia is the growing public opposition to the existing troop levels in the principal host country: Japan. The massive US military presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa has long provoked hostility from the local population. But the tension has recently grown worse. Crimes committed by US troops, ill-considered e-mail comments by the US military commander (who questioned both the sanity and character of Okinawan officials), and the desire of Okinawans to recover some of the US military bases for more productive economic uses have all combined to stoke tensions to the worst point in many years. The pressure is now on to reduce the American military profile on the island, yet no other prefecture in Japan wants to host the troops that would have to be relocated. Nor is a new host country likely to volunteer. The final factor is the improved threat environment in east Asia over the past decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed one major threat, and the rapidly diminishing detente between North and South Korea another.
True, the behavior of China remains a concern, but the overall regional threat environment is substantially better than it was in the past. Given that improved setting, it would hardly come as a surprise if Washington concluded that US troop levels could be reduced without any serious risk to America's interests in the region. The modest but noticeable increase in the military capabilities of such US allies as Japan and South Korea provides an added margin of safety.
It would also not come as a surprise if a reduction in forces took place under a Republican president. Indeed, GOP presidents have been more inclined than their Democratic counterparts to approve such withdrawals. It was Richard Nixon who not only pulled US troops out of Southeast Asia but also withdrew one division from South Korea. It was Republican George Bush in 1990 and 1991 who ordered the number of troops stationed in Europe reduced from 300,000 to 100,000 -- a move that reflected an improved environment in that region with the end of the Cold War. The current Bush administration is likely to scale back the US military presence in east Asia over the next four years. It is uncertain how large the reduction will be, but a new force level of 50,000 to 60,000 troops is a distinct possibility. The nations of east Asia would be wise to prepare now for that change and take more responsibility for their own defense.
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author or editor of 13 books on international issues.
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