President Chen Shui-bian (
Why did Qian's statement that, "the PRC and Taiwan are both parts of China," emerge in the first place? We believe there may be two reasons.
Chen has been in power for over half a year. In that time, because of the Chinese Communist Party's boycott of his government and its ceaseless military threats against Taiwan, political, economic, and social conditions in Taiwan have suffered a relentless battering. The fall in the stock market created economic turmoil and caused the people of Taiwan to feel dissatisfied with DPP rule. At the same time, the Beijing authorities have adopted every sort of political tactic. They have been aggressive in their attempts to win over elements of Taiwan's political and economic spheres in a united front scheme, and they have met with some success.
Qian thinks he can further influence Taiwan's political scene. So he has raised the above-mentioned theory of "one China and one Taiwan." in order to avoid negotiating with those in power in the ROC, forcing the Taipei authorities to come and negotiate the "big three links" (大三通) according to Beijing's framework and goals. If this plan succeeds, then Taiwan will be locked in the heavy shackles of "one China." Will Roth then ask himself whether he spoke for the interests of the PRC or for those of the US? Will he wonder whether he did the right or the wrong thing?
In addition, the Bush administration has just taken the stage in the US. The Republican party's anti-communist position is firmer than that of the Clinton government. Bill Clinton's policy of appeasement and in particular the "new three no's" (新三不) he proclaimed in Shanghai, are likely to be changed by the Bush administration. Qian's theory of "one China and one Taiwan," which replaces Taiwan in the negotiating framework of the PRC, presents the Bush government with a difficult problem. It is a probe to test the response of the Bush government after it takes office. The Beijing authorities are currently paying close attention to the negotiations between the US and Taiwan over military arms sales. They hope to use Roth's words to influence arms sales between the US and Taiwan. A US diplomat has become a mouthpiece for the PRC and the man upon whom they are pinning their hopes. What kind of problem is this?
We have noticed that a similar kind of voice has begun to be articulated in Taipei's opinion forums. There are those who worry that buying advanced weapons from the US will provoke the PRC into attacking. This is a manifestation of "communist phobia," and if this kind of thinking spreads, it will be extremely detrimental to Taiwan's security.
Speaking from a military perspective, when the capability on each side of the Taiwan Strait is evenly matched and Taiwan enjoys a slight advantage in advanced weapons systems, then war will not easily break out. Once the military advantage tips towards China, then the PRC, which established itself by military power, will take advantage of Taiwan's weakness to attack Taiwan. The more one fears the communists, the more one will risk coming under attack. To protect Taiwan's security, Taiwan's politicians should now carefully consider how to maintain a military advantage that will deter the PRC from attacking after 2005. "Communist phobia" cannot deter the PRC from attacking Taiwan.
In sum, Qian's speech can only be considered a maneuver made prior to negotiations. It falls far short of giving "room for compromise." That would require a sincere statement of recognition of the existence of the ROC.
Put simply, under the guidance of the "one China" principle and on the basis of the reality of two Chinas, both sides should earnestly research and negotiate how the PRC and the ROC can gradually integrate economically and politically in order to form a Confederate Republic of China. Only this could be called a framework with room for compromise.
Finally, we would like to make it known that in the final days before Bush's new Republican administration came to power in the US, Qian and Roth spoke from Beijing and Washington respectively, one making pronouncements and the other echoing his words. They sent out a warning and tried to induce the ROC government to kneel before the PRC's "one China." In this way they also tried to influence the new Republican administration in the US to adjust its policy toward China. But we trust that the Bush administration will certainly verify that the following passage is contained in the Joint US-China Communique from Shanghai, concluded between then president Richard Nixon on his 1972 trip to China, and the late premier Zhou Enlai
In fact, this declaration is precisely the position and framework of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation." We trust that the Bush administration will not change the position declared by the US in the Shanghai Communique.
(This is part two of a two-part series that began on Wednesday.)
Kan Yiu-yu is a former editor in chief of the Hong Kong-based Wen Wei Po. Chris Wu is editor in chief of the China Spring and China Affairs magazines. Yu Hao-cheng is a visiting scholar at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and a board member of Human Rights in China.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
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