Since the president's inter-party task force on cross-strait affairs reached the "three acknowledgements, four suggestions" consensus, everyone has been trying to figure out whether the Constitution is inclined toward unification or independence. The answer is -- both.
Taiwan's Constitution was first enacted in 1947 -- on the basis of a Republic of China framework, of course. The Additional Articles sidelined the main text. All the arrangements in the Additional Articles were tailor-made for Taiwan and designed to be compatible with the reality of the cross-strait divide. Since Chen Shui-bian
China and Taiwan's pro-unification camps are not happy about this. But Taiwan never raised the "one China" issue in the first place. The reality is that there are two different, divided political entities, one on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) "special state-to-state" formulation came closest to this reality, which should be a point of departure for any change to cross-strait relations.
China's "one country, two systems" model, which it put into effect in Hong Kong and wants to sell to Taiwan, has no appeal whatsoever to the people of Taiwan. Hong Kong was a colony before its handover. Taiwan is already a free, highly democratic country. Even Bill Clinton has felt compelled to call on China to increase incentives for Taiwan.
Now that the cross-strait task force has hammered out its conclusions, changes in cross-strait relations are imminent. The most important task at the moment is to skip the semantic obstacles of "one China" and build a basic, workable cross-strait framework. If China wants to build a positive environment across the Strait, it will have to join hands with Taiwan and build short and medium-term frameworks to ensure a stable transition.
A show of goodwill should start with the signing of a ceasefire or mutual non-aggression agreement -- along the lines that Taiwan will not declare independence and China will not use force against Taiwan. This would then serve as the basis for reconciliation.
Once the two sides enter the WTO, trade and economic exchanges will inevitably increase. If the two sides can build basic mutual trust and remove obstacles to trade, the three direct links and the "no haste, be patient" policy will no longer be issues. The two sides may even be able to work out a division of labor and build a "Greater Chinese Common Market"
Freedom, democracy and prosperity are Taiwan's primary concerns. Within the framework of a Greater Chinese Common Market, the economic gap between the two sides will narrow. But it is not possible for the two sides to immediately jump into a political framework because China still has a long way to go in terms of freedom and democracy.
Under the premise of a "future one China," the two sides would be able to maintain their own international space as independent political entities and build a transitional framework for cross-strait relations modeled after the British Commonwealth and the Commonwealth of Independent States. This would not only help minimize the differences and cultivate mutual trust, but will also help China develop into a free and democratic modern nation through economic development.
China's current zest for haggling and military threats reveals its lack of self-confidence. Only by showing generosity and giving Taiwan more space for self-determination can China gain a better chance for unification.
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