China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛), the man in charge of Beijing's foreign and Taiwan policies, recently gave a new interpretation of the "one China" principle. Qian said "one China" does not have to be an "either this or that" dichotomy, and even denied that "one China" means the People's Republic of China.
In other words, "one China" does not have to be either the "Republic of China" (ROC) or the "People's Republic of China (PRC)." In that case, since the PRC has a seat in the UN, why shouldn't the ROC as well?
For all Qian's talk, however, that is a proposition from which current reality could not be more distant. After Taiwan's diplomatic allies sent a letter to Kofi Annan on Aug. 3 calling for Taiwan's entry into the UN, Beijing immediately pulled down its "soft" mask.
At a press conference on Aug. 4, China's foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao (朱邦造) expressed "strong indignation and firm opposition" to the proposition. The Chinese media and Web sites followed suit with a barrage of criticism against Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
Why is the ROC not allowed to join the UN while the PRC is a fully-fledged member? Isn't it a sign of an "either-or" scenario? Both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany had seats in the UN before their reunification.
If North and South Korea can show respect for each other's sovereignty and head of state, why can't the PRC and the ROC? Since the ROC is in fact willing to do so, why can't the PRC?
A number of recent events have also attested to this dichotomy:
First, Beijing has tried to create more hurdles for Taiwan's entry into the WTO, seeking to push Taiwan to recognize "one China" in the hope of gaining sovereignty over Taiwan. This dirty trick immediately prompted a response from the US, which warned Beijing that such a move would delay its own WTO entry. The Washington Times said that China was upping the ante against Taiwan at the last moment. But many people had long anticipated this and Bill Clinton's appeasement policy will only embolden Beijing to apply further pressure. Taiwan should be prepared for the worst -- which will amount to nothing more than delayed entry -- and should not sell out her sovereignty.
Second, Beijing continues to sabotage Taiwan's foreign relations. It has invited Taiwan's eight African diplomatic allies to attend, as observers, a "Sino-African cooperation forum" in October in Beijing. Obviously, Beijing wants to use economic offers to break Taiwan's diplomatic ties.
Third, Beijing lodged numerous complaints with Washington against Chen's recent stopover in Los Angeles. The complaints led the White House to pressure members of Congress who had planned to meet Chen.
Given those developments, Taiwan will see its diplomatic space shrink unless it makes a diplomatic breakthrough. The key to this will be to become a UN member and make its voice better heard in the global community.
Some are worried that any attempt aimed at UN membership may provoke Beijing. With or without pragmatic diplomacy, however, the ROC's very existence, economic success and democratic politics are all thorns in Beijing's side of which it would be only too happy to rid itself. Some criticize Taiwan for its so-called "money diplomacy," first practiced in fact by China.
In the name of "internationalism," Beijing bought the support of many countries in its bid to enter the UN, where it replaced the ROC. Beijing has in fact pushed Taiwan into money diplomacy.
To ensure Taiwan's international status and security, Taiwan must engage in pragmatic diplomacy and spare no effort in seeking UN membership.
Paul Lin is a political commentator based in New York.
Translated by Francis Huang
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