Ambassador Stephen S. F. Chen (
In a written report not formally reviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Chen apparently criticized President Lee Teng-hui's
"Stephen Chen bursts the Emperor's new cloth," was a China Times headline. The United Daily News also used Chen's remarks to criticize Lee's formula.
Should Lee have consulted with the US and obtained its approval before making his statement?
If the US had disagreed and Lee went ahead and said what he did to the Deutsche Welle, wouldn't US-Taiwan relations have suffered a greater jolt?
If the Taiwan government had consulted with US and obtained its consent first, wouldn't Beijing have criticized Washington for dividing up China and endorsing Taiwan independence?
It was very unwise and inconsiderate for the US State Department to ask for Taiwan's prior consultation. Taiwan's government should have made its position clear to the US more forcefully, not just accepted the State Department's view, as Chen appears to.
Is there a lack of mutual trust between Taiwan and the US? If yes, what explanation has the TECRO made during these past few months?
Minister of Foreign Affairs C. J. Chen (
Should we believe the ambassador or the foreign minister?
With respect to legislators' criticisms that he did not lobby hard in favor of the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act," Ambassador Chen said that the consistent position of our government has been "to hope for its enactment, but without getting involved" (
Why did the 10 American public relations firms retained by MOFA sit idly by?
To pander to Beijing, American businesses have lobbied against the bill in Congress. US exports to Taiwan exceed those to China by more than one and half times. American firms which do business with Taiwan could have lobbied on its behalf, why haven't they?
God saves those who save themselves! The ambassador can't simply hope for the best and stand by idly. Even if TECRO can't directly get involved, there are still many other things it could do.
There are hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese in the US, including American-born Taiwanese. Most are US citizens and they constitute a long neglected yet significant force in mainstream American society. The ambassador's relations with them are less than ideal. Legislators have received many letters of complaint from Taiwanese in the US criticizing the ambassador for his "Great China" mindset and ideology and his reiterations of China's unification. Many Taiwanese-Americans do not want to have anything to do with him.
What is the job of Taiwan's representative in the US? According to Ambassador Chen's reply in the Legislative Yuan, it does not include pushing for diplomatic relations with the US. Although establishing official ties would be quite difficult at this point, has TECRO ever requested them?
Has our representative ever reminded the US government that Taiwan is a democratic country, free and independent of China and that 22 million people here elected their own president in 1996?
Taiwan has become a new republic, different from the ROC which the US derecognized in 1979. If Taiwan wants to make any breakthrough in its relationship with the US, it needs a representative in the US and high-ranking MOFA officials who truly identify with Taiwan, rather than talk about the illusionary unification of a democratic China.
With respect to Taiwan's future relations with the US, the ambassador has made some very startling evaluations. He said "the future work relationship between TECRO in Washington and the US administration may experience various negative boycotts by the latter and presumably, the efforts to promote substantive bilateral relationship with the US could encounter practical difficulties before the new US president takes office."
While we should not slight this warning, we wonder whether he is overly pessimistic? As the US enters its election year, its policies toward China and Taiwan will become major issues in the election campaign. It is impossible that the Clinton administration would deliberately boycott Taiwan at the risk of public outrage.
The question is does the ambassador have the wisdom, ability and willingness to seize the right timing and opportunity and shift to an active gear?
If Ambassador Chen can't identify with Taiwan and refuses to promote the "special state-to-state" policy, or feels that he cannot adequately handle the difficult tasks in the US, then he should retire. He shouldn't hold on to the post and engage in passive resistance.
Even more importantly, if the policymakers feel that he is not suitable for the job, is unwilling or unable to implement the government's policies, then they should let someone else do it.
Parris Chang is the chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Legislative Yuan and a professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University.
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