South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun recently announced that Seoul would redefine its diplomatic position to make it a driving force in achieving a balance of power in northeast Asia. He has given the indication that he is seeking to extricate his country from the US-Japan-South Korea relationship on the Korean Peninsula.
In addition to Roh's announcement, China and Russia announced that they would launch a joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea this fall, and on Feb. 19, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee listed the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective" in this region. These developments have led many Asian strategic experts to believe that East Asia is headed toward a new cold war.
Roh came to power thanks to his anti-US platform. Washington then decided to withdraw one-third of the troops by 2008 and adjust the role of the US-South Korea alliance. In the face of the downgrading of the alliance, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and its refusal to participate in the six-party talks, Seoul is concerned that Washington may employ methods other than diplomatic means to overthrow the Pyongyang regime in the second half of this year -- especially now that the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee assigned a supervisory role in the Asia-Pacific region to the US and Japan. The US-Japan alliance has also issued a statement to support "peaceful unification" of the Korean Peninsula. These were key factors that pushed South Korea to develop closer ties with China while keeping its distance from the US in order to adjust its strategic position.
Uniting with China to oppose the US is another matter altogether. The historical disputes between South Korea and Japan are related to Japanese colonial rule, and the problem of Koreans living in Japan. This is different from the strategic competition between China and Japan, which takes place under the guise of historical issues. The recent attack on Japan's embassy in China is one of the results of this conflict.
However, while South Korea and Japan are embroiled in a territorial conflict over the sovereignty of the cluster of islets called Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, they are also negotiating a free trade agreement. The redefinition of South Korea's strategy will certainly affect cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea, although Seoul is not opposing the US-Japan alliance.
China purposely chose to hold a joint military drill with Russia in the waters off the Shandong Peninsula to send a political message to the US-Japan alliance. But it is Russia that has the most to gain strategically from a conflict between China and the US.
This is just like former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger's association with Beijing, in the hope of pressuring both Beijing and Moscow to make friends with Washington.
Today, Moscow hopes that Beijing and Washington will maintain stable relations with it. This is why many observers in Asia believe that, by selling arms to Beijing while maintaining that Taiwan is an integral part of China, Moscow hopes to keep Beijing occupied with the Taiwan issue while ignoring any problems between Russia and China.
Therefore, South Korea's strategic readjustment and Russia's actions can hardly be interpreted as a new cold war -- with China, Russia and Korea on the one side and the US-Japan alliance on the other. The situation is related to Russia's hopes of sowing discord between China and the US. South Korea's policy of distancing itself from the US is also different from an anti-US stance.
Meanwhile, conflicts between Japan and South Korea reflect actual historical and social sentiments, and are different from the competitive nature of Japan's interaction with China. A strategic adjustment has indeed taken place in East Asia, but this will not lead to a new cold war.
What is interesting is that Taiwan is an unrevealed key factor in this wave of strategic adjustment. From this perspective, the key for Taiwan to gain advantage in this situation lies in its strategic plan regarding the Korean Peninsula, rather than its adjustment to the Taiwan-US-Japan relationship.
Lai I-chung is director of foreign policy studies at the Taiwan Thinktank.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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