There have been reports that Tung Chee-hwa (
Tung's first term lasted five years. His policy implementation was ineffective, giving him little public support, and the Hong Kong economy was in the doldrums. Despite this, he was elected -- if that is what it can be called -- to serve a second term.
Apart from vigorous support from former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (
According to Deng Xiaoping's (
Although the CCP has gradually understood what a market economy is, its one-party autocracy remains unchanged, and the party makes all decisions for the Chinese people. As China continues with its economic experiment, perhaps the contradictions of such an autocratic system are not serious enough to cause significant conflict in its young and booming market economy. However, in highly capitalist Hong Kong, such totalitarian factors are out of tune with its market economy, which enjoys a great deal of freedom. This is also why, no matter how hard Tung tried, his performance was still unable to satisfy the people of Hong Kong. The territory's people, even though they never enjoyed the sweet taste of democracy during the days of colonial rule, are now discontent with the fake "one country, two systems." So how could the people of Taiwan, who enjoy a high degree of democracy and autonomy, possibly accept this policy?
The replacement of Tung before the end of his legal term could mean that Beijing has lost faith in the chief executive's ability to govern the territory. Beijing is therefore pushing him out before the situation worsens. Nevertheless, whether Tung's successor is Chief Secretary for Administration Donald Tsang (
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
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