At the end of last year, a diplomatic development with consequences reaching well beyond the regional level emerged. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state, paving the way for political, economic and strategic cooperation with the African nation.
The diplomatic breakthrough yields, above all, substantial and tangible benefits for the two countries, enhancing Somaliland’s international posture, with a state prepared to champion its bid for broader legitimacy.
With Israel’s support, Somaliland might also benefit from the expertise of Israeli companies in fields such as mineral exploration and water management, as underscored by Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Saar.
Israel, in turn, finds in Somaliland a strategically positioned partner near the Red Sea. In addition to commercial advantages, there is also the prospect of intelligence cooperation and the potential of Hargeisa becoming a useful point of presence for Tel Aviv, although there has been no official confirmation on that aspect.
The new partnership could also generate benefits beyond its immediate scope, particularly for countries that maintain solid relations with both Israel and Somaliland.
A striking example — despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties — is Taiwan. Taipei has strengthened its partnership with Somaliland through investments, mutual trust and support for each other’s core causes. In that regard, Taiwan has been a crucial ally and point of leverage for Somaliland, helping it advance its aspirations on the international stage.
Equally strategic are Taiwan’s relations with Israel, which has been seeking deeper bilateral cooperation, especially in semiconductors — an industry Israeli companies aim to become a part of through Taiwan’s broader value chain.
From the new alliance between Somaliland and Israel, Taiwan could gain significant advantages across multiple sectors. From technology to agritech, and cybersecurity to people-to-people exchanges, Taipei could coordinate trilateral initiatives involving with Tel Aviv and Hargeisa.
For example, by leveraging Israel’s expertise in water management, Taiwan could help channel advanced solutions that support Somaliland’s efforts to secure reliable water resources, while simultaneously enriching its own portfolio of partnerships in climate-resilient technologies.
More distant, for the moment, is the prospect of a partnership extending into security and defense. The potential in that regard would be considerable — particularly in areas such as drones and cybersecurity — yet it remains premature to envisage that the otherwise cordial relations among the parties might already be poised to evolve into a broader alliance encompassing defense.
By expanding its influence in Somaliland, Taiwan can position itself to take part in some of the projects that Israel is expected to launch in the country, thereby enabling Taipei to coordinate trilateral initiatives that could yield a range of advantages.
The first of these benefits would be economic. Israel has signaled its intention to channel substantial investment into Somaliland — from infrastructure to resource development — and Taiwan could be drawn into such ventures as a complementary partner, gaining access to new commercial opportunities.
The gains would also be strategic. Taiwan has every interest in bolstering its image as a state capable of cultivating prosperous and mutually beneficial relationships on the international stage, particularly through the creation of high-value partnerships that enhance the standing of all parties involved.
In that sense, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could act as a strategic multiplier: A single diplomatic act capable of generating a cascade of benefits not only for the two contracting nations, but also for Taiwan, whose ties with Hargeisa and emerging synergies with Israel allow it to gain broader diplomatic, economic and technological opportunities.
That is a goal that Taiwan pursues with steady determination and that aligns with its wider effort to safeguard its existence as a sovereign and democratic state.
In this endeavor, the presence of allies who share specific principles and interests becomes a strategic asset of exceptional importance, for it is through such international partnerships that Taiwan enhances the stability, resilience and independence that underpin its long-term security.
Michele Maresca is an analyst at Il Caffe Geopolitico, an online international law journal, and the think tank Geopol21.
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
“Of course you can choose not to be Taiwanese, just do not stay here,” chairwoman of Taipei 101 operator Taipei Financial Center Corp Janet Chia (賈永婕) said in an online interview with local entertainer Tai Chih-yuan (邰智源), triggering intense discussion on social media, with politicians across party lines weighing in. In the interview, which was aired on May 14, Chia and Tai’s discussion over a meal in Taipei 101 covered Chia’s career change from entertainer to chairwoman and US climber Alex Honnold’s free solo climb up the Taipei 101 building. During the interview, Chia said, “Being on this land, we
RSS