Readers will have to forgive another editorial about referendums in Taiwan. But there is at least one aspect of the DPP's current plan which merits criticism.
First let us make it clear that we unequivocally support the idea of referendums, and this support goes beyond the emasculated version of the concept currently backed by the DPP which offers us direct democracy on contentious but nevertheless small issues but not for the biggest issues of all -- those that affect the nation's destiny. Surely this is a "thin end of the wedge" strategy; once the practice of referendums is established for lower-level issues it will become impossible for major issues -- anything to do with sovereignty -- to be decided by a cabal of Cabinet ministers as of yore. Give people some say, reasons the DPP, and they will want more say, which may be a safeguard against the greatest danger Taiwan faces, that of a backroom deal on unification being pushed upon the people of Taiwan without any kind of democratic consultation.
All in all a subtle tactic, then, but with one great problem. The stalking horse for a referendum, the issue on which a referendum is deemed necessary such that a law to legalize the practice should be passed in the legislature, is the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.
Again we must lay down a caveat, namely we have in the past been adamantly opposed to the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Our opposition is based on a number of factors: the question of the wisdom of nuclear power on a small island facing attack, probably involving a large number of missiles, from its bellicose neighbor; the fact that Taiwan has no repository for nuclear waste and, given the limitations of its crowded territory, will face great difficulties in constructing one; and last but not least, the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has been a US$5 billion plus boondoggle for construction industry cronies of the previous KMT government and we see no reason why KMT-connected businessmen should be allowed to dip so deeply into the public purse.
Nevertheless, we have to ask whether it is is appropriate now to still be considering the cancellation of the plant's construction, which has to be considered a possibility if it is to be made the subject of a referendum. The plant is now 47 percent complete. It is scheduled to go on stream in three years' time. Canceling its construction would involve the waste of a couple of billion US dollars, which is hardly pocket change. The plant has long figured as an integral part of Taipower's projections of future generating capacity, and cannot, at short notice, be replaced; without it we may have to return to the summer peak period rolling brownouts of the mid-1990s. Then there is the question of contractual obligations. Taiwan signed a number of agreements with foreign suppliers of various bits of equipment. These agreements have been thrown into jeopardy once already when the government canceled the plant's construction in the autumn of 2000, only to be forced to restart it six months later. Now they are to be cast into doubt once more. "Taiwan, a great place to do business -- unless the government changes its mind" is hardly the most enticing of slogans.
Regrettably we have to put up with the power plant whether we like it or not. The time for cancellation is long past. Making this the raison d'?tre for the referendum law only makes sense if one is cynical enough to hope that the referendum will, in fact, back construction. In which case the government will face criticism for organizing a very expensive way to confirm the status quo. But perhaps this is a price it is prepared to pay if it has larger issues in its sights.
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