The drought in southwestern China has attracted much attention lately. Almost every year, the Chinese government lists investment in construction projects for hydraulic facilities used by farmlands as one of its major policies. In reality, however, they have been unsuccessful in effectively carrying out this policy.
Massive hydraulic construction projects still receive government financing, but over the last 30 years, there have been almost no upgrades to small reservoirs and irrigation canals in rural areas. Of the 4 trillion yuan (US$585.9 billion) the Chinese government invested in its domestic economy last year, only an extremely small portion was spent on hydraulic facilities for farmlands. This is directly responsible for rural areas’ inability to fight drought.
The huge sums of money invested by the Chinese government are basically aimed at things that can bring direct economic gain to local governments. A lot of these investments have in fact been disastrous for the environment and for ecological conservation.
For example, the rubber industry in Yunnan Province has always been one of the province’s main industries. From 1994 to 2007, the purchase price of unvulcanized rubber skyrocketed by 900 percent. However, tests from official geographic information systems have also shown that big rubber plantations have affected the climate in Yunnan, causing the average temperature in the region to increase by 0.4°C to 0.5°C over the last 10 years.
Furthermore, mass planting of eucalyptus trees is something that has started in China as the pulp and papermaking industries have developed. The People’s Government of Yunnan Province, in particular, has assisted companies in the paper industry to build up massive stocks of timber and these companies have acquired large areas of land, including mountain and forest areas.
In just a few years, 12.14 million hectares of eucalyptus trees and other fast-growing trees replaced the original natural forests and alpine vegetation. These large areas of eucalyptus trees have been called “green deserts” because there are no birds in the trees and no vegetation beneath them.
The negative effects on the environment of these plantations are being compared to that of massive hydropower development projects.
In other words, the aggressive economic development strategies of local governments are one of the main reasons why natural disasters are becoming more and more prevalent.
There is an even more serious problem behind these economic development strategies and that is the unequal distribution of water resources. In China, cities and industries receive more water resources than agricultural areas and farmers. When serious droughts last for months on end, it is the villages and peasants that are hurt the most.
The reason behind this situation is the unequal distribution of power and rights. In addition, farmers, including those who are affected by droughts, have no way of organizing groups to fight for their rights and are unable to make their demands known via regular channels.
This is a form of manmade disaster and it is something that the Chinese government is trying very hard to ignore and avoid taking responsibility for. This is a growing issue that we cannot afford to ignore any longer.
Wang Dan is a prominent figure in China’s democracy movement and holds a PhD in history from Harvard University.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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