Reuters, DUBAI, United Arab Emirates
A warning by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has crystallized fears among Gulf states that reopening the Strait of Hormuz might be the most Iran-US talks can achieve, falling short of the broader de-escalation they regard as vital.
Officials and analysts expect the next round of negotiations, due in Islamabad, to focus increasingly not on Iran’s missiles or regional proxies, but on uranium enrichment limits and how to handle Iran’s leverage over the strait, the world’s most critical oil shipping route.
Gulf officials warn the approach risks entrenching Iran’s grip on Middle East energy supplies by managing rather than dismantling its leverage, prioritizing global economic stability even while leaving the nations most exposed to the energy and security consequences outside the formal decisionmaking process.
Gulf sources say US-Iran diplomacy is now centered less on rolling back Iran’s missile program, and more on enrichment levels and tacitly accepting Tehran’s leverage over the strait, through which about one-fifth of global oil supplies pass.
Although negotiations remain stalled over enrichment, with Iran rejecting both zero enrichment and demands to ship its stockpiles abroad, Gulf officials say the shift in priorities itself is troubling.
“At the end of the day, Hormuz will be the red line,” one Gulf source close to government circles said. “It wasn’t an issue before. It is now. The goal posts have moved.”
There was no immediate response from Gulf governments to requests for comment on the issues raised in this article.
Iran’s threats to Gulf shipping during the war have broken long-standing taboos around the strait, making its disruption a realistic lever in negotiations for the first time.
The strait’s central role was bluntly articulated by Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, in a post on social media on April 8.
“It’s not clear how the truce between Washington and Tehran will play out, but one thing is certain — Iran has tested its nuclear weapons. It is called the Strait of Hormuz. Its potential is inexhaustible,” Medvedev said.
The remark cast the strait as leverage enabling Iran to raise costs and shape rules without crossing the nuclear threshold.
Iranian security officials privately echo that view, describing the strait not as a contingency, but as a long-prepared instrument of deterrence.
“Iran prepared for years for a scenario involving the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, planning every step,” a senior Iranian security source said. “Today, it is one of Iran’s most effective tools — a form of geographic leverage that serves as a powerful deterrent.”
The source described the strait as a “golden, invaluable asset rooted in Iran’s geography — one the world cannot take away precisely because it flows from Iran’s location.”
A second Iranian source, close to the Revolutionary Guards, went further, suggesting that a long-standing taboo surrounding the use of the strait had now been broken.
The source described the strait as a sword “drawn from its sheath” that the US and regional states could not ignore, providing the region with leverage against external powers.
What alarms Gulf states most, analysts say, is that while Iranian missiles, drones and proxies have repeatedly attacked their region, negotiations are increasingly framed almost exclusively around the strait because of its global economic impact, marginalizing Gulf security concerns.
At its core, the dispute is less about who controls the strait than about who sets the rules of passage, Gulf sources say, reflecting a broader shift away from fixed international norms toward power-based arrangements.
That exposes an imbalance between those who define the rules and those who bear the consequences when rules are broken, Emirates Policy Center president Ebtesam al-Ketbi said.
“What is taking shape today is not a historic settlement, but a deliberate engineering of sustainable conflict,” she said. “Who’s suffering from missiles and proxies. Israel, and specifically the Gulf states. What would be a good deal for us is [addressing] missiles, proxies — and Hormuz, and it seems they don’t care about the missiles or the proxies.”
Analysts warn such an approach in the talks would not so much resolve tensions as stabilize them at manageable levels, an outcome that might suit Washington and Tehran, but risks entrenching instability for Gulf states living under the threat of missiles.
The US-Israeli war on Iran, which began on Feb. 28, has already left Gulf economies absorbing the fallout, from attacks on energy infrastructure to rising export and insurance costs. Alternative trade export routes raise costs and remain exposed to the same Iranian missile threats.
Diplomats say Gulf officials have urged Washington against full sanctions relief, advocating a phased approach to test Iran’s behavior. They say core threats remain unaddressed, notably missiles able to hit Gulf capitals and Iran’s armed proxies used as extensions of the Iranian state.
Across the Gulf, sentiment toward Washington now ranges from quiet resentment to growing frustration and confusion over unilateral US decisionmaking.
Saudi-Arabia based Gulf Research Center chairman Abdulaziz Sager said dealing with the Iran issue required “a different approach.”
“The US is part and parcel of regional security, but that does not mean acting unilaterally — going full-fledged without involving the region,” he said.
While Gulf leaders bristle at being sidelined, they privately and publicly concede that US military capabilities continue to shape outcomes through their unmatched superiority.
Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla said that Gulf states had survived the war in large part due to their own defenses and sophisticated US-supplied weapons such as the THAAD and Patriot air defense systems.
Yet while the US is indispensable, it is fallible, Abdulla said, citing what he called its underestimation of the likelihood of confrontation over the strait.
The US has repeatedly committed to defending its Gulf allies during the war via air and missile defense cooperation, naval security and protection of critical infrastructure.
One of the war’s lessons, Gulf states say, is the limit of reliance on a single external protector, said Mohammed Baharoon, director of the Dubai-based research center B’huth.
Gulf rulers say they have long warned Washington against conflict with Iran, yet they have remained publicly mute since the war broke out. The restraint reflects not just diplomacy, but uncertainty over a conflict they pay for in economic damage and defense costs, but do not control.
Now, as Washington and Tehran negotiate, Gulf officials argue their exclusion from the talks is no longer a regional issue, but a global one, given the strait’s international importance.
Additional reporting by Parisa Hafezi
Minister of Labor Hung Sun-han (洪申翰) on April 9 said that the first group of Indian workers could arrive as early as this year as part of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India and the India Taipei Association. Signed in February 2024, the MOU stipulates that Taipei would decide the number of migrant workers and which industries would employ them, while New Delhi would manage recruitment and training. Employment would be governed by the laws of both countries. Months after its signing, the two sides agreed that 1,000 migrant workers from India would
On March 31, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released declassified diplomatic records from 1995 that drew wide domestic media attention. One revelation stood out: North Korea had once raised the possibility of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In a meeting with visiting Chinese officials in May 1995, as then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) prepared for a visit to South Korea, North Korean officials objected to Beijing’s growing ties with Seoul and raised Taiwan directly. According to the newly released records, North Korean officials asked why Pyongyang should refrain from developing relations with Taiwan while China and South Korea were expanding high-level
Japan’s imminent easing of arms export rules has sparked strong interest from Warsaw to Manila, Reuters reporting found, as US President Donald Trump wavers on security commitments to allies, and the wars in Iran and Ukraine strain US weapons supplies. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ruling party approved the changes this week as she tries to invigorate the pacifist country’s military industrial base. Her government would formally adopt the new rules as soon as this month, three Japanese government officials told Reuters. Despite largely isolating itself from global arms markets since World War II, Japan spends enough on its own
When 17,000 troops from the US, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, Canada, France and New Zealand spread across the Philippine archipelago for the Balikatan military exercise, running from tomorrow through May 8, the official language would be about interoperability, readiness and regional peace. However, the strategic subtext is becoming harder to ignore: The exercises are increasingly about the military geography around Taiwan. Balikatan has always carried political weight. This year, however, the exercise looks different in ways that matter not only to Manila and Washington, but also to Taipei. What began in 2023 as a shift toward a more serious deterrence posture
RSS