Since taking office in October last year, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has maintained consistently high approval ratings for her Cabinet.
Takaichi’s approval rating has reached as high as 72 percent, the Japanese-language Nihon Keizai Shimbun, or Nikkei, said in a front-page report on Monday.
Last month’s meeting between Takaichi and US President Donald Trump was also received positively by more than 60 percent of Japanese, with strong support among people younger than 39. Throughout Japan’s political history, it has been rare for a prime minister to sustain such a high level of support nearly six months after taking office.
By contrast, there is a clear gap between the approval rating of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which stands at about 40 percent, and the opposition parties, which are mostly in the single digits. This phenomenon reflects an opportunity for consolidation within Japan’s political landscape — which has been marked by frequent leadership changes — and the potential to unite around a single figure.
Just after former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe stepped down, Japan’s policy toward China became more cautious. Although former Japanese prime minister Yoshihide Suga largely continued Abe’s approach, subsequent leaders — Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba — placed considerable hope in relations with China due to their personal ties, which led to some wavering in foreign policy. Meanwhile, China took this opportunity to expand its influence and adopted an increasingly assertive external posture, which indirectly stirred unease and backlash among Japanese.
Against this backdrop, Takaichi rose to prominence, and a combination of circumstances led her to become Japan’s first female prime minister. However, at the start of her administration, Takaichi faced the disadvantage of a divided Japanese Diet where the ruling bloc held fewer seats than the opposition, along with shifts within the LDP’s coalition with its then-partner, Komeito. At the same time, she has had to contend with the pressures from inflation and the yen’s depreciation, which have increased the financial burden on people’s livelihoods.
Regarding diplomatic and security issues, Takaichi in a parliamentary session put forth the argument that China using armed force against Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, provoking strong backlash from China and intense criticism from the opposition. In response, she dissolved the lower house of parliament and returned to the electorate, successively turning the situation around — as a result, the LDP regained control of the Japanese House of Representatives, thereby consolidating Takaichi’s governing foundation and securing a clearer popular mandate for advancing her policies.
Takaichi has maintained high approval ratings for six months large due to the novelty of having a female prime minister, strong support from the younger generation, public expectations regarding her economic and security policies, her decisive leadership style — which contrasts with the perceived indecisiveness and delays of her predecessor — as well as the stable development of US-Japan relations.
In terms of national security, while Takaichi’s remarks regarding a “Taiwan contingency” have generated external pressure, they have also solidified domestic discussions on security issues. The ongoing blockade crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted the limitations of Japan’s pacifist constitution when it comes to responding to emerging risks. Looking ahead, how Japan adjusts its geopolitical security policies and laws would become a key challenge for the Takaichi administration.
Wang Hui-sheng is a founding member of the East Asian Research Institute.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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