In an op-ed for the Taipei Times (“Foreign-run domestic politics,” Feb. 8, page 8), Howard Shen (沈正浩) — foreign press secretary for the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) 2024 presidential campaign — paints the KMT as a misunderstood steward of fiscal responsibility, unfairly maligned by “misinformed” US senators. He writes that the KMT’s opposition to the NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.61 billion) special defense budget is a principled stand for legislative oversight.
That argument collapses the moment one examines the legislative record.
Shen said that a defense plan must survive the “scrutiny of its own legislature,” but the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party have blocked that budget from even entering the agenda 10 times. They cannot claim to be “scrutinizing” a document they refuse to let into the room.
Shen leans heavily on one statistic: The legislature last year passed a record-high defense budget of NT$471 billion. That number sounds impressive when divorced from the fact that China’s defense budget has risen every single year for decades and dwarfs Taiwan’s many times over. “Record high” in nominal terms means little when the threat environment has transformed so radically.
Shen calls the special budget an “administrative blank check.” If that were true, the logical legislative response would be to bring the bill to committee, demand specifics and amend the terms.
Instead, the KMT has held the entire budget hostage, demanding that President William Lai (賴清德) appear for an unprecedented, potentially unconstitutional question-and-answer session as ransom.
Shen points to the US$21 billion backlog of US arms as a reason to stop spending. “The docks remain empty,” he writes. This is a sleight of hand.
The new NT$1.25 trillion “T-Dome” budget is specifically designed for asymmetric warfare — with drones, loitering munitions and artificial intelligence-integrated systems. These are precisely the types of low-cost, high-impact technologies that can be delivered and deployed much faster than traditional platforms such as F-16s.
Second, defense procurement operates on decade-long cycles. Halting funding now because of current delivery delays is like a farmer refusing to plant a tree today because the one he ordered last year has not grown fruit yet.
Finally, there is the deterrence deficit: When US senators Roger Wicker and Dan Sullivan express disappointment, they are not victims of “disinformation.” They are looking at the math. If Taiwan signals it is unwilling to fund its own defense, it undercuts the primary argument for US support and intervention.
Stop pretending the KMT is “naive” or “confused.” They are seasoned political operators who know exactly how their arguments sound in Washington and how their actions look in Beijing.
Why is the KMT really blocking the budget? Shen mentions “peace through strength,” but the party’s leadership seems far more interested in “peace through proximity.” As the KMT blocks defense spending at home, KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is signaling a desire for a high-level meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Beijing does not need to issue “orders” to the KMT; the alignment of interests is clear.
If the KMT can present itself as the only party capable of “cooling” tensions — by weakening Taiwan’s military posture — they hope to win back power as the “party of stability.” However, stability bought by unilateral disarmament is merely a stay of execution.
Shen concludes by asking the US to help Taiwan maintain a “democracy worth defending.” On this, we agree — but a democracy is only worth defending if its leaders prioritize the survival of the state.
By blocking the means for Taiwan to defend itself, the KMT is not protecting the “power of the purse”; they are emptying the armory while the enemy is at the gates.
If the KMT truly believes in a “reasonable” defense, they should stop the blockade, put the bill on the floor and let Taiwanese see what can actually be done to defend the nation.
John Cheng is a retired businessman from Hong Kong now living in Taiwan.
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