Taiwan is not wrong to fear Chinese political interference. However, what is at stake is whether the country is building a durable democratic defense or tightening a security net that might prosecute the wrong people.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s latest push to amend the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) reflects a strategic anxiety. Beijing’s political warfare no longer operates through party-to-party channels; it moves through shell companies, online networks, community groups and informal political brokers. Lawmakers say that the law is too narrow, too slow and too easy to evade. In response, they have proposed tougher penalties, wider coverage and earlier intervention, including bringing “would-be candidates” under criminal liability.
However, the debate has exposed a deeper problem. Taiwan is trying to address a sophisticated influence campaign with a legal framework that remains structurally fragile. Prosecutors have investigated hundreds of cases since the law took effect, but only a small number have resulted in convictions. That gap is not evidence that interference is imaginary; it reflects how difficult it is to prove covert foreign direction. However, when one suggests that acquittal does not necessarily mean innocence, the line between suspicion and legal judgement starts to blur — and that is where democratic systems become vulnerable.
International comparison matters. Australia faced a similar wave of Chinese interference in 2017 and 2018. Its response was not simply to impose harsher criminal penalties. Instead, it built a two-layered system. Its Espionage and Foreign Interference Act strengthened criminal enforcement, but it did so on top of an intelligence and judicial architecture, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, warrant-based investigations and specialized procedures for handling sensitive national security evidence. In parallel, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act handled the problem from a different angle: It forced disclosure. Anyone acting on behalf of a foreign principal to influence politics, media or public debate had to register.
That second pillar is crucial. By making foreign political influence visible, Australia reduced the need to criminalize suspicious actions. Sunlight, not just prosecution, is its first line of defense.
Taiwan is missing that balance. It is moving toward the punitive side of the Australian model without building the transparency side. There is no comprehensive system requiring political consultants, lobbyists, advocacy groups or media organizations to declare foreign-linked funding or direction. Instead, influence is expected to be discovered after the fact, through investigation, denunciation and prosecution. That places enormous pressure on prosecutors — and invites political interpretation of what should be a legal judgement.
Amending the Anti-Infiltration Act to cover loosely defined “pre-candidates,” or imposing prison terms for a widening range of conduct, might project resolve, but without clearer definitions and institutional safeguards, it also risks turning political life into a zone of legal uncertainty. That uncertainty would chill domestic participation.
Taiwan’s challenge is not choosing between security and freedom; it is designing institutions that protect both. Chinese influence operations would continue to evolve. What endures is the credibility of the democratic system responding to them.
If Taiwan wants to raise the real cost of interference, it should start by doing what successful democracies have done: bring political influence into the open, professionalize national security justice and ensure that the law remains a shield for democracy rather than a substitute for it.
Bonnie Yushih Liao is an assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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