The results of Honduras’ presidential election were officially certified on Dec. 24 last year, nearly a month after polls closed, with the conservative National Party’s Nasry Asfura, who received US President Donald Trump’s endorsement, winning by a narrow margin. He is set to take office on Jan. 27.
More than just a change of government, Asfura’s election sent political shockwaves through the wider region. During his campaign, Asfura agreed with his opponent, Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party, that Honduras would be “100 times better off” if it had maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan, rather than switching recognition to China, and pledged to re-examine agreements signed with Beijing.
Clearly, cracks are showing in China’s investment-heavy diplomacy in Latin America. Amid shifting global conditions, Taiwan might soon have a new opportunity to stage a diplomatic reversal in the Americas.
Tegucigalpa severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2023 under then-Honduran president Xiomara Castro’s administration, which chased attractive pledges from Beijing, including the construction of a hydroelectric dam, purchases of whiteleg shrimp, infrastructure funding and debt assistance. More than two years on, the reality has fallen short of the promises.
Key infrastructure projects have yet to begin, shrimp exports have not recovered, and an influx of Chinese goods has undercut local industries and employment. Mounting disappointment among voters was ultimately expressed at the ballot box.
Asfura has spoken bluntly about assistance and trade when Taipei and Tegucigalpa had diplomatic ties, with Taiwan delivering far more tangible results for the nation. It was more than campaign rhetoric; it is a reflection of widely held public views on the issue.
The election is illustrative of a broader phenomenon: China’s model of trading financial incentives and promises for diplomatic realignment is increasingly being questioned due to economic slowdowns and implementation shortcomings.
Honduras’ shift is not an isolated case, but a concrete example of the diplomatic pendulum in swing. When promises go unfulfilled, foreign policy adjusts to meet the political reality in which livelihoods and public trust are key. Chinese promises have lost their veneer. Voters are no longer accepting empty checks, and instead want reliable and complementary partnerships.
Similar conditions are emerging elsewhere. In the Pacific, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati have seen rising domestic concern and controversy following their shift toward Beijing, particularly over China’s involvement in policing and security affairs.
In the Solomon Islands, opposition — especially in its Malaita Province — has continued to simmer. As it stands, growing regional security pressures are increasing the likelihood that changes in government or public opinion could lead the countries back toward the democratic camp and Taiwan.
In Latin America, Nicaragua and El Salvador have experienced widening trade deficits and blows to local industries after signing economic and trade agreements with China. By contrast, Taiwan’s provisions of agricultural technology, medical assistance and infrastructure support are remembered fondly by local farmers and technocrats.
Should political conditions ease sufficiently, diplomatic recalibration might be back on the agenda for economic recovery.
In central and eastern Europe, Lithuania’s experience is particularly instructive. Despite facing sustained pushback in the form of economic pressure from China, Lithuania chose to deepen substantive cooperation with Taiwan, resulting in a stronger industrial and values-based alliance. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia are seeking closer partnerships with Taiwan in semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and green energy.
Such forms of cooperation, rooted in shared values and industrial complementarity, are far more durable than one-off financial inducements.
While Asfura’s election boosts diplomatic confidence in Taiwan, it also underscores the need for strategic evolution. Diplomatic objectives should not be confined to restoring the number of formal allies, but should aim for deeper structural connections.
Taiwan’s leverage today differs fundamentally from the past. It plays a pivotal role in advanced semiconductors and AI supply chains, has experience in effective public health governance, and technological expertise in environmental, social and governance-driven carbon reduction projects for a green energy transition. They constitute global public goods that many countries urgently need. Choosing Taiwan as an ally is not merely a statement of values, but an investment in security, reliability and long-term development.
Honduras’ shift might only be the beginning. As global supply chains are restructured and awareness of the risks posed by authoritarian expansion grows, more countries are reassessing the costs behind China’s promises. Increasingly, there is space for Taiwan to move from a defensive to a proactive form of diplomacy. This is a turning point defined by trust, values and choices for the future.
Edwin Yang is an associate professor at National Taiwan Normal University and chairman of the Central Taiwan Association of University Professors.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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