Taiwan has long been accustomed to political rivalry. Today it is facing a more serious constitutional moment. Sharp debate, shifting alliances and public protest are familiar features of its democratic life, but Taiwan is grappling with an executive-
legislative deadlock triggered by the government’s refusal to countersign legislation passed by an opposition-controlled legislature.
What distinguishes the constitutional standoff is not its intensity, but its atmosphere. It feels less like a decisive battle and more like a chess match played in heavy fog — pieces moving cautiously, intentions obscured and no one entirely sure where the edge of the board lies.
The immediate dispute arose from the Executive Yuan’s refusal to countersign legislation passed by the Legislative Yuan, citing procedural flaws, insufficient transparency and the risk of long-term institutional harm. Supporters argue that the move defends constitutional order; critics see it as an expansion of executive discretion. Taiwan has entered uncharted constitutional waters.
Confronted with an opposition-
controlled legislature, the executive has turned to non-countersignature or selective non-implementation as a strategic response. The opposition, while accusing the government of constitutional violations, has avoided invoking the most powerful legislative remedy — a no-confidence vote — mindful of the electoral uncertainty and political risk such a move entails.
The result resembles a chess endgame in which both sides are afraid to mistep. Each side advances a piece, waits, recalculates and advances again. Yet when the board remains crowded and the game drags on, the danger is not checkmate, but stalemate.
Compounding the risk is the breakdown of institutional navigation tools. Constitutional adjudication, designed to clarify disputes between the branches of government, has been sidelined by procedural constraints — most notably, the inability of the Constitutional Court to convene due to unresolved judicial appointments and statutory thresholds that prevent cases from being heard.
Democratic systems rely not only on rules, but on visibility — clear authority, predictable enforcement and credible arbiters. When laws are passed yet their implementation becomes uncertain and constitutional review can be neutralized through political maneuvering, governance begins to resemble navigation by instinct rather than by chart.
For the public, the picture is equally troubling. Citizens observe laws suspended in ambiguity, constitutional disputes unresolved and political leaders invoking democratic principles while avoiding decisive institutional action. Confusion hardens into cynicism. Democracy starts to feel less like a system that produces outcomes and more like an endless process without destination.
The erosion of trust is the most serious challenge Taiwan faces. Democratic resilience depends on internal confidence in the strength of the democratic system. A society that loses faith in its constitutional compass becomes vulnerable not through dramatic rupture, but through quiet disengagement.
In chess, a stalemate ends the game without a winner. At sea, drifting in fog risks unseen hazards. In constitutional politics, prolonged ambiguity carries similar dangers. Systems designed to manage conflict ultimately depend on decisions being made, not indefinitely deferred.
If constitutional uncertainty is allowed to harden into routine, the consequences will not be immediate or spectacular. They would arrive gradually, as paralysis becomes normalized and ambiguity accepted as governance. By the time the fog finally lifts, the greatest loss might not be a single political defeat, but the end of the public’s belief that democratic government is capable of finding its way forward at all.
Bonnie Yushih Liao is an assistant professor in Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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