Reactions to the White House’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) focused on familiar themes: “America First,” a skepticism of foreign entanglements and an emphasis on economic strength over ideological crusades. However, the document has a more consequential message that Taiwan cannot afford to ignore.
The strategy does not abandon Taiwan. It does not endorse Chinese coercion or conquest. However, it increases uncertainty about the US’ commitment, elevates transactionalism and shifts more responsibility onto regional actors. For Taipei, the danger lies not in what the NSS says explicitly, but in what it declines to guarantee.
Articulation of US policy toward Taiwan during the administration of former US president Joe Biden and US President Donald Trump’s first term were largely framed in moral and ideological terms: democracy versus authoritarianism, freedom versus coercion. This year’s NSS is a departure. It grounds US engagement less in values and more in concrete national interests such as economic resilience, military effectiveness and strategic clarity. Under this more transactional worldview, allies and partners cannot be mere dependents. US security guarantees would focus less on ideological alignments and require more burden-sharing.
In this framework, Taiwan is no longer an exception. While not a treaty ally, it has benefited for years from bipartisan consensus in Washington that Taiwan’s defense is central to US credibility in Asia. The NSS says that the US should defend Taiwan not in the name of defending US credibility or global democracy, but because the nation’s independence affects US power, prosperity and security.
For Taiwan, this means that symbolic alignment with democratic ideals — while still important — would no longer be sufficient to anchor US support.
To maintain US backing under this new paradigm, Taipei needs to ensure it remains indispensable to the US’ strategic position and that the benefits of its partnership to the US outweigh the material and political costs Washington would incur in defending the nation. Taipei would need to demonstrate its seriousness about its own defense and alignment with broader US strategic priorities.
Defense spending delays, political infighting and uneven implementation of asymmetric defense reforms would carry greater strategic cost. Taiwan is no longer a cause in itself that must be defended at all costs. Instead, it is one variable among many in Washington’s competition with Beijing.
The NSS reiterates US opposition to unilateral changes to the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and emphasizes the need to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. However, compared with prior strategies, it is notably
thinner on alliance assurances and operational clarity.
Some might say that this weaker rhetoric preserves flexibility and reduces the risk of escalation with China. However, this softer stance might signal weaker resolve and encourage Beijing’s aggression. Deterrence relies not just on capability, but on the enemy’s perception of a nation’s willingness to act.
For Taiwan, ambiguity is becoming increasingly dangerous. Beijing is adept at exploiting gray zones, probing for hesitation and testing thresholds. A strategy that touts restraint and nonintervention without articulating clear red lines or commitments risks inviting aggression rather than preventing it.
The NSS does not condemn Taiwan. However, it should spur policymakers on the island to make several reforms.
First, Taiwan needs to reframe its strategic narrative. Adherence to democratic principles would no longer secure US support. Taiwan should emphasize and expand its role in economic security, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence supply chains and the Indo-Pacific military architecture.
Second, Taiwan should accelerate its domestic security infrastructure. This means developing asymmetric capabilities, increasing stockpiles, demonstrating resilience and planning for robust civil defense. In a transactional security environment, preparedness is the currency of trust. Taipei needs to do more to demonstrate it can effectively defend itself.
Third, Taiwan should broaden its diplomatic portfolio. Reliance on Washington alone — especially under volatile US domestic politics — is increasingly risky. The White House is more likely to view Taiwanese moves to deepen ties with Japan, Europe and regional powers as prudent burden-sharing rather than disloyal hedging.
Fourth, Taiwan has to recognize an uncomfortable truth: Strategic ambiguity cuts against the weak more than the strong. The clearer Taiwan’s value and resolve, the less room there is for misinterpretation in Beijing — or hesitation in Washington. Taiwan should recognize that internal divisions on defense spending and security policy have external consequences. In a transactional era, unity matters. Allies are less likely to take risks for a partner that appears unwilling to take risks for itself.
For Taipei, the central question the NSS raises is whether the nation’s political and military apparatus can rapidly adapt to a more transactional, interests-based and ambiguous US posture. Taiwan’s future would be shaped less by what Washington promises and more by how indispensable Taiwan makes itself to US interests and regional stability. The window to do so remains open, but it is narrowing.
Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. From 2016 to 2020, he served as legislator-at-large in the Legislative Yuan.
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