The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China’s (IPAC) support for Taiwan has been steady and decisive.
Taiwan’s participation in IPAC was also the earliest instance of cross-party cooperation in this Legislative Yuan, demonstrating that although parties might differ sharply on domestic policy, when unified on international engagement, they can advance Taiwan’s national interest.
At IPAC’s invitation, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) made the first-ever speech in a European legislature by a sitting senior Taiwanese official, raising public awareness in Taiwan of what IPAC actually is. In fact, IPAC’s significance for Taiwan goes far beyond this.
From drafting and promoting the now-widely cited model resolution that UN Resolution 2758 does not settle Taiwan’s status, enabling parliaments to adopt formal resolutions, to issuing an immediate condemnation when it came to light that Chinese embassy staff had attempted to ram the car carrying Hsiao in the Czech Republic last year, IPAC has consistently taken action to support Taiwan against aggression by China.
Before these events, public discussion of IPAC in Taiwan was limited. One reason is structural: IPAC was established in 2020, but Taiwan could not obtain membership until last year.
For four years, despite being the country most directly targeted by Chinese coercion, Taiwan could not speak within the IPAC as an official member.
IPAC membership requires at least two lawmakers from different major parties. From 2020 to last year, independent legislator Freddy Lim (林昶佐), New Power Party (NPP) Legislator Claire Wang (王婉諭) and Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Fan Yun (范雲) participated, while the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) declined to join. As the NPP only had three seats, they did not meet the “major party” requirement, so Taiwan remained shut out.
The Taiwan People’s Party’s (TPP) participation solved the dilemma Taiwan had faced for four years, as no party holds a majority and the TPP became a pivotal party capable of determining the outcome of votes. TPP Legislator Chen Chao-chi (陳昭姿) joined IPAC alongside Fan, and Taiwan was formally admitted.
In recognition of the TPP’s contribution, following her speech in the European Parliament, Hsiao sent a handwritten letter to Chen to express her gratitude. Citizens across party lines publicly acknowledged and thanked Chen as well.
The TPP’s self-imposed two-year rule is coming into force soon. Within the incoming TPP caucus, there has yet to be clarity as to who would represent Taiwan in IPAC.
The participation of the new legislators would ensure that Taiwan retains IPAC membership, sending the right signal that Taiwan is committed to self-defense. It would also show the public that political parties stand firm on national sovereignty and can be trusted in their loyalty to the nation.
As the front line against the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian expansionism, Taiwan’s continued participation in IPAC is important. IPAC began with eight member jurisdictions; as the world has recognized the CCP’s threat to global democracy, it has grown to 43 jurisdictions in addition to the European Parliament. This means that Taiwan’s circle of allies is growing.
We can therefore be optimistic that beyond the milestone event of the vice president speaking at a European legislature, more breakthrough diplomatic initiatives might be facilitated through IPAC’s alliance network. Those who care about our country’s best interests would naturally look to Taiwan’s continued and deeper participation in IPAC.
Wu Yi-syuan is a senior staff member in the office of a Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
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