China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, entered service this week after a commissioning ceremony in China’s Hainan Province on Wednesday last week. Chinese state media reported that the Fujian would be deployed to the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the western Pacific.
It seemed that the Taiwan Strait being one of its priorities meant greater military pressure on Taiwan, but it would actually put the Fujian at greater risk of being compromised.
If the carrier were to leave its home port of Sanya and sail to the East China Sea or the Yellow Sea, it would have to transit the Taiwan Strait or face a longer journey through the Luzon Strait. Upon entering the Taiwan Strait, the vessel’s movements would be closely monitored by Taiwan and be within range of Taiwan’s dense array of anti-ship missiles.
When the Fujian enters the Taiwan Strait, it would be at its most vulnerable.
The Luzon Strait route would not be a better option, as the US military has bolstered its deployments around the Batan Islands in the middle of the Luzon Strait — enough to bring the entire waterway within range of its air defense and anti-ship missiles.
The Fujian requires refueling every few days. The longer the detour, the greater the logistical pressure.
When Chinese state media say the vessel is to be deployed to the Taiwan Strait, it is repackaging weakness as strength. Such tactics are only scary to uninformed people.
Huang Wei-ping works in public service.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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