Taiwan’s solar industry over the past few years has faced new headwinds from within as flawed rules, exacerbated by disinformation, stoked safety concerns about adopting this renewable energy source. The situation is completely different from what the industry encountered about a decade ago, when overcapacity and drastic pricing competition from China took a toll on local solar firms. This time, companies are seeking government support and overseas expansion to survive.
Solar projects are obstructed by a nonstop flow of disinformation, including false claims that they hamper farming and fishery development, while the risks of photovoltaic waste are overstated. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and industry representatives have fought disinformation by providing correct information, but their efforts are swamped by the volume of material that needs addressing.
Moreover, some local government officials have been embroiled in corruption scandals, which deepened concerns among the public over solar energy adoption and prompted the central government to tighten its grip on approving new projects. Projects require a legislator’s endorsement, while city councilors need to host public meetings — the process is stricter than launching a house construction project. That all comes before lengthy reviews by government agencies.
Meanwhile, the opposition parties have called for the nation’s overall energy policies to be reassessed, which seems to have made the government passive about promoting solar panel installations to avoid political attacks. That is despite the government’s struggles to reach its goal of deploying 35 gigawatts of solar capacity by the end of 2035, which would mean Taiwan’s solar capacity was 36 percent of all electricity resources.
The government’s passive attitude was reflected in the absence of President William Lai (賴清德) and Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin (龔明鑫) from this year’s Energy Taiwan Show, a stark contrast to former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) regular participation during her eight years in office from 2016. Attendance among industry players also dropped. Some renewable energy developers did not showcase their latest products, while the number of participants dropped to 450 from 480 last year. Visitor numbers were also down, with 20,000 attending, falling short of the organizers’ expectations of 28,000.
Amid the unfavorable business environment, many local solar firms have swung into losses in the past few years. The nation’s major solar cell and module manufacturers — Motech Industries Inc, TSEC Corp and United Renewable Energy Co — are recalibrating their business strategies and planning to explore opportunities in overseas markets such as the US and Japan. Motech expects the overseas market to account for 70 percent of its shipments soon, up from 50 percent, while TSEC expects overseas market contribution to rise to 50 percent.
Green energy scarcity has driven prices up to NT$5.4 per kilowatt-hour last year from NT$4.65 in 2020 while the government’s feed-in tariffs have decreased, Taiwan Power Co data showed.
The government should step up its efforts to help the local solar industry, not only to pull the industry out of a slump, but to boost the deployment of solar energy to meet fast-growing demand with wind power and other emerging renewable energy technologies in limbo.
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