For years, Europe’s discussion of Taiwan has been a diplomatic afterthought, folded into broader debates about China and strategic autonomy. That habit no longer matches reality. What happens in the Taiwan Strait is going to shape Europe’s economy, its security assumptions and its credibility as a community of democracies. The choice is not between war and neutrality. It is between treating Taiwan as a polite footnote or addressing it as a strategic priority.
Taiwan is not a distant symbol. It is woven into Europe’s daily life. The nation anchors the global semiconductor supply chain, producing more than 60 percent of the world’s chips and 90 percent of the most advanced ones, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association. A blockade or military action would not only destabilize East Asia, it would shake European factories, hospitals and households. No industrial strategy can shield the continent from such a shock. Strategic autonomy begins with recognizing vulnerabilities and acting before they are exposed.
The case for engagement is not only economic. Taiwan is a pluralist democracy that emerged from authoritarianism on its own terms. It holds competitive elections, maintains judicial independence and sustains a vibrant civil society. In a region where authoritarian power projects confidence, Taiwan quietly proves that prosperity and freedom can coexist. If Europe claims to defend the rule of law and human dignity, it cannot treat Taiwan’s future as a matter of etiquette.
Europe already has a foundation to build on. The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy names Taiwan as a key partner, and the European Parliament has urged closer ties. Several member states have acted. Lithuania opened a “Taiwan Representative Office” and, despite Beijing’s retaliation, remained economically resilient. The Czech Republic under President Petr Pavel expanded cooperation in innovation and education. Denmark, Germany and France maintain offices in Taipei, and have deepened exchanges in trade and technology. None of these steps contravened the “one China” policy. All showed that clarity, handled professionally, is compatible with prudence.
Yet hesitation persists. Many states still treat Taiwan policy as a subset of their China policy. That is a strategic mistake. On issues such as supply chains, cyberresilience, health security and aviation standards, Taiwan is a partner of foremost importance. The longer Europe delays engagement, the harder it is going to be to build habits of cooperation any future crisis is going to require.
A serious approach begins by normalizing presence. More member states should establish or upgrade representative offices in Taipei, staffed with economic, scientific and cultural attaches who can support European companies and attract Taiwanese investment. This means investing in semiconductor resilience through joint research, talent exchanges and structured investment frameworks. Diversification is not achieved by speeches in Brussels; it is built through cooperation with those who already manufacture at scale.
Europe should support Taiwan’s participation in international bodies where global safety depends on full information. Its exclusion from the WHO and the World Health Assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite its early and effective response, is a clear example of how politics can undermine collective security. The same logic applies to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and WTO technical bodies. Europe does not need loud campaigns, it needs steady persistence, making the case that inclusion benefits everyone.
When Lithuania faced economic coercion, the EU’s coordinated response mattered beyond that single case. It showed that member states are not left to fend for themselves when they make principled decisions. That message must not fade.
Critics say that Europe cannot risk commercial ties with China or be drawn into another geopolitical rivalry. However, engagement with Taiwan is not a proxy for someone else’s agenda. It is a European interest, measured in factory shifts, delivery schedules and the credibility of its values. A clearer Taiwan policy does not exclude dialogue with Beijing; it strengthens Europe’s position in it. Ambiguity may feel safe. In a crisis, it rarely is.
In Portugal, two resolutions are up for a vote next month. One proposes transferring consular and administrative matters currently handled in Macau, under Beijing’s jurisdiction, to the Portuguese embassy in Tokyo or another neutral jurisdiction. The second urges the government to open a Portuguese representation in Taipei through either the national trade agency or a cultural institute. These steps would bring Lisbon in line with other European partners while maintaining a balanced diplomatic stance. If approved, they would correct longstanding anomalies and signal that Portugal understands what is at stake.
Europe often waits for consensus before acting. Taiwan is not an issue that rewards delay. It is not asking Europe to fight its battles, only not to be treated as an inconvenience. Its voters continue to choose open society under pressure; its institutions function; its industry supplies the world. That example is worth defending, not only for what it says about Asia, but for what it says about Europe as well.
History is not going to judge Europe on whether it found the perfect phrasing to avoid offense. It is going to judge whether Europe acted with the clarity the moment demands. Silence is no longer prudence. If Europe wants to be taken seriously as a geopolitical actor, it must prove it when it matters most. Taiwan today is one of those moments.
Joao Pedro Gomes is a foreign affairs specialist and senior political advisor at the Portuguese Parliament.
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