On Tuesday, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislative caucus held a news conference criticizing amendments to seven laws to protect undersea cables. They argued that if Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force sorties crossing the Taiwan Strait’s median line cannot be pushed back, it is hard to see how the government could possibly enforce laws protecting undersea cables. The remark sounds convincing, but it misses two fundamental points: the changing international context and the very nature of modern security. Undersea cable resilience is not merely a Taiwan Strait military issue; it is a strategic challenge faced by democracies worldwide.
First, protecting undersea cables is a strategic infrastructure task.
This week’s Taiwan-Europe Submarine Cable Security Cooperation Forum clearly demonstrates that European nations face similar threats to their undersea infrastructure. From energy pipelines to communications cables, strategic adversaries use “gray zone” tactics to test democratic allies’ resilience — this is no longer news.
Against this backdrop, Taiwan’s amendments are far from political theater. They would create a long-needed legal framework designed to close existing protection gaps: integrating cable protection into clear monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and aligning responsibilities among the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ocean Affairs Council and other key agencies. Without legal authority, there can be no enforcement; without procedures, there can be no action. This is the kind of institutional capacity every modern democracy must build to defend its critical infrastructure.
Second, conflating air incursions with cable protection is a category error.
When KMT legislators say: “If warplanes cross the median line and we cannot drive them back, how do we enforce cable protection laws?” they confuse two entirely different security domains. PLA air incursions involve military deterrence and strategic response, which concern defense posture, diplomacy and regional stability. In contrast, undersea cable protection lies in the realm of administrative regulation, criminal liability and maritime enforcement.
The government could require vessels to keep their Automatic Identification Systems on, prohibit illegal anchoring or trawling near cables, seize offending vessels and impose penalties on violators. These are concrete, executable enforcement actions. Using the challenge of military deterrence to question the feasibility of civil enforcement weakens Taiwan’s nonmilitary resilience instead of strengthening it.
While the KMT caucus calls for “action over rhetoric,” it cut key resilience budgets last year. Funding for the single-window service for cable-laying under the digital ministry was completely removed and 90 percent of the budget for enhancing cable landing point security was slashed. If lawmakers truly value enforcement capacity, why defund the very programs that make it possible?
Nostalgia for an era before “gray zone” interference ignores how the threat has evolved. As Beijing advances military-civil fusion and steps up harassment on critical infrastructure, maritime and undersea activities have grown more frequent and complex. Confronting this new reality responsibly means updating legal systems, strengthening resilience, improving enforcement tools and deepening international cooperation — not clinging to outdated assumptions about the past.
Finally, national security requires action and cooperation.
Taiwan does not stand alone. Democracies such as EU and NATO countries, as well as Japan, are building interagency coordination frameworks and undersea infrastructure protection regimes encompassing intelligence sharing, patrol operations, incident investigation, accountability and rapid repair mechanisms. The Taiwan-Europe forum connects Taiwan’s experience with that of its partners, creating a dual layer of collective deterrence and collective recovery. Within this framework, legislation is the starting point, budget is the muscle and collaboration is the lever. None can be missing.
National security is not built on the hope of peaceful coexistence with adversaries; it rests on the determination to work with allies and prepare together. Those who call for action should begin by supporting necessary legislation, protecting critical funding and engaging in international cooperation. Those who prefer rhetoric should refrain from dismantling the very defenses that safeguard the state and its people.
Gahon Chiang is a congressional staff member in the office of Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Chen Kuan-ting, focusing on Taiwan’s national security policy.
The cancelation this week of President William Lai’s (賴清德) state visit to Eswatini, after the Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius revoked overflight permits under Chinese pressure, is one more measure of Taiwan’s shrinking executive diplomatic space. Another channel that deserves attention keeps growing while the first contracts. For several years now, Taipei has been one of Europe’s busiest legislative destinations. Where presidents and foreign ministers cannot land, parliamentarians do — and they do it in rising numbers. The Italian parliament opened the year with its largest bipartisan delegation to Taiwan to date: six Italian deputies and one senator, drawn from six
Recently, Taipei’s streets have been plagued by the bizarre sight of rats running rampant and the city government’s countermeasures have devolved into an anti-intellectual farce. The Taipei Parks and Street Lights Office has attempted to eradicate rats by filling their burrows with polyurethane foam, seeming to believe that rats could not simply dig another path out. Meanwhile, as the nation’s capital slowly deteriorates into a rat hive, the Taipei Department of Environmental Protection has proudly pointed to the increase in the number of poisoned rats reported in February and March as a sign of success. When confronted with public concerns over young
Taiwan and India are important partners, yet this reality is increasingly being overshadowed in current debates. At a time when Taiwan-India relations are at a crossroads, with clear potential for deeper engagement and cooperation, the labor agreement signed in February 2024 has become a source of friction. The proposal to bring in 1,000 migrant workers from India is already facing significant resistance, with a petition calling for its “indefinite suspension” garnering more than 40,000 signatures. What should have been a straightforward and practical step forward has instead become controversial. The agreement had the potential to serve as a milestone in
China has long given assurances that it would not interfere in free access to the global commons. As one Ministry of Defense spokesperson put it in 2024, “the Chinese side always respects the freedom of navigation and overflight entitled to countries under international law.” Although these reassurances have always been disingenuous, China’s recent actions display a blatant disregard for these principles. Countries that care about civilian air safety should take note. In April, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) canceled a planned trip to Eswatini for the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III’s coronation and the 58th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic
RSS