In 1925, Mao Zedong (毛澤東) published his article “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” (中國社會各階級的分析), which outlined six distinct classes and spelled out his thinking. He wrote that “our enemies are all those in league with imperialism — the warlords, the bureaucrats, the comprador class, the big landlord class and the reactionary section of the intelligentsia attached to them,” and “Our closest friends are the entire semi-proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. As for the vacillating middle bourgeoisie, their right wing may become our enemy and their left wing may become our friend, but we must be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks.”
Mao urged his followers to ask: “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?” reminding them that “we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies.”
This is critical to understanding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach to relations with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). At the time, CCP cofounder Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀) sought to see the party join forces with the KMT, but Mao disagreed, saying that Chen was “concerned only with co-operation with the KMT and forgot about the peasants; this was right opportunism.”
To understand the direction of the CCP under Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the roots of “Mao Zedong thought” provides an abundance of clues. Mao’s approach was not one that took the KMT as a whole, but saw it as a group that could be picked apart into friends and enemies. From there, one of the next steps was — to borrow the title of a CCP History Press publication last year detailing the infiltration of undercover agents into the KMT — to create a “war in the hearts of the enemy.” Compiling the files and stories of 100 underground CCP members, the report outlines the history of psychological warfare waged against members of the KMT government in the years leading up to their expulsion from China in 1949.
The history of the development of the KMT can be divided into two eras, one based in China and one in Taiwan. During its China era, the CCP openly defined it as an enemy relatively late, but there are still records of how the CCP conducted infiltration operations, sought out friends, and captured the upper ranks and operating procedures of the KMT camp. As for how the CCP might deal with the “remnants” of the KMT left in Taiwan today, need we speculate? China is not disguising its intentions — there is an air of inevitability about it, to use one of its favorite words.
After KMT chairwoman-elect Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) victory in the party’s leadership race on Saturday last week, Xi immediately sent his congratulations, to which Cheng responded with a thank-you message affirming their shared belief in “one China” and opposition to Taiwanese independence.
The pair appear to fit together quite harmoniously — it is not difficult to see that their perception of one another is firmly in the “friend” category. If Cheng and her supporting ranks in the KMT can be understood as friends in the hearts of our enemies, what, then, of the party establishment’s elites? For the likes of former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), media personality and influential KMT member Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) and Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕), would they only count as friends so long as they fall in line with Cheng? Sooner or later, would those who oppose her line be rooted out in a second great defeat of the KMT?
For Taiwanese, the question of the hour is whether the KMT’s 52 legislators and 14 mayors are about to unite behind their new leader, or show resistance. For elections to come, this must serve as a critical indicator.
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper).
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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