A recent poll showing that half of the Taiwanese respondents fear Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) becoming “US-SMC” reflects a profound anxiety about technological sovereignty that transcends traditional geopolitical frameworks. Yet this binary concern obscures a more nuanced reality about the semiconductor industry’s evolution and Taiwan’s strategic position in an increasingly multipolar technological landscape.
Taiwan’s worry about TSMC’s Americanization reveals an interesting paradox: The very success that makes TSMC globally indispensable also makes it vulnerable to external pressures.
With TSMC controlling 64 percent of the global contract chipmaking market and Taiwan producing 63.8 percent of the world’s semiconductors, the nation has achieved unprecedented technological leverage.
However, this dominance has created what economists call “too big to fail” syndrome, where success becomes a strategic liability.
The fear of TSMC becoming “US-SMC” fundamentally misunderstands the nature of modern semiconductor manufacturing. Despite its Arizona expansion reaching full capacity utilization and plans for six additional fabs from a US$165 billion investment, TSMC’s core technological DNA remains irreversibly Taiwanese.
The company’s most advanced N2 node research, critical intellectual property development and top engineering talent continue to reside in Taiwan. What Taiwan is witnessing is not corporate emigration, but technological diplomacy.
Rather than viewing TSMC’s global expansion through the lens of zero-sum national competition, Taiwan should embrace what could be termed “distributed excellence” — a strategy that leverages geographical diversification to enhance rather than diminish Taiwan’s technological centrality. The Arizona operations, producing chips for Apple, AMD, Qualcomm, Broadcom and Nvidia, represent TSMC’s response to commercial realities rather than political pressures. US tech giants account for the majority of TSMC’s revenue, making US manufacturing logical and inevitable.
This expansion strengthens Taiwan’s position in three main ways. First, it reduces the geopolitical risk premium associated with Taiwan-only production, making TSMC a more stable partner for global customers.
Second, it creates institutional interdependence that makes any disruption to Taiwan’s operations catastrophic for the US.
Third, it positions Taiwan as an innovation hub of a global network rather than a vulnerable single point of failure.
Yin Nai-ping (殷乃平), a professor of finance at National Chengchi University, correctly identifies TSMC as Taiwan’s key geopolitical asset, but incorrectly frames its value in terms of exclusivity.
Taiwan’s strategic importance comes not from monopolizing TSMC’s production, but from controlling its technological evolution. As long as Taiwan remains the epicenter of semiconductor innovation — developing next-generation processes, training elite engineers, and housing advanced research and development — the nation would maintain its indispensable role regardless of where manufacturing occurs.
Consider the parallel with Switzerland’s pharmaceutical industry: Swiss companies manufacture globally, yet Switzerland remains the undisputed center of pharmaceutical innovation because it controls the intellectual capital. Taiwan can adopt a similar model, evolving from a manufacturing fortress to an innovation empire.
Taiwan’s semiconductor success story was built on globalization, not isolation. TSMC’s founders understood that serving global markets required global thinking. Today’s expansion into Arizona, with additional facilities planned for Europe and potentially other regions, represents the natural evolution of this philosophy. The alternative — maintaining Taiwan-only production amid rising geopolitical tensions — would be strategically suicidal.
The real threat to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is not TSMC’s international expansion, but the nation’s potential insularity. Countries across the world are investing hundreds of billions of US dollars in semiconductor capabilities: the US CHIPS Act has catalyzed US$450 billion in private investment, Europe has committed more than US$103 billion, and South Korea plans US$470 billion through 2047.
In this environment, Taiwan’s choice is clear: Lead the globalization of semiconductor manufacturing or watch others build alternatives.
Taiwan should reframe the TSMC expansion narrative from defensive anxiety to offensive opportunity. Instead of fearing the creation of a “US-SMC,” Taiwan should champion the emergence of “Global-SMC” — a distributed network of facilities united by Taiwanese technological leadership and innovation. This requires shifting from a manufacturing-centric to an innovation-centric identity.
The Arizona fabs would likely face the same challenges that have historically favored Taiwan: complex supply chains, skilled workforce requirements and the iterative learning that comes from concentrated expertise. These advantages cannot be easily replicated, giving Taiwan time to evolve its competitive position.
Rather than competing on manufacturing scale, Taiwan can compete on technological sophistication, advanced packaging and next-generation process development.
The poll results reflect a natural, but ultimately counterproductive impulse to preserve “status quo” advantages. True strategic thinking requires embracing change to maintain leadership.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry succeeded by being globally minded, technologically ambitious and commercially pragmatic. These same principles, not nostalgic protectionism, would ensure its dominance going into the future.
TSMC’s global expansion represents not the dilution of Taiwan’s technological power, but its multiplication across continents. The question is whether Taiwan would lead this transformation or be left behind by it.
Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
History might remember 2026, not 2022, as the year artificial intelligence (AI) truly changed everything. ChatGPT’s launch was a product moment. What is happening now is an anthropological moment: AI is no longer merely answering questions. It is now taking initiative and learning from others to get things done, behaving less like software and more like a colleague. The economic consequence is the rise of the one-person company — a structure anticipated in the 2024 book The Choices Amid Great Changes, which I coauthored. The real target of AI is not labor. It is hierarchy. When AI sharply reduces the cost
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the